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INTRODUCTION
In April of 1976, Judge John Curtin of the Western District of New York
held that the city of Buffalo had created and maintained segregated schools in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and ordered the
desegregation of the school system.' He urged the community to look upon
1. Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 960 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
remanded in part, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978).
Desegregation of the Buffalo schools was accomplished through a still ongoing series of
legal actions against the Buffalo Board of Education, the Buffalo Superintendent of Schools, the
Common Council and the mayor.
The federal district court found that the Buffalo public school system was deliberately
segregated and held the Buffalo Board of Education, the Buffalo Superintendent of Schools, the
Common Council, the New York State Commissioner of Education and the members of the
State Board of Regents liable. Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978)
[hereinafter Nyquist 1]; see infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
Defendants appealed the decision, and the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's find-
ing that three defendants - the Board of Education, the Superintendent of Schools, and the
Common Council - were liable for unlawful segregative acts. The circuit court, however,
reversed the lower court's finding of liability for the New York State Education Commissioner
and members of the State Board of Regents due to insufficient evidence. The circuit court
remanded the case to the district court for creation of an appropriate remedy. Arthur v. Ny-
quist, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978) [hereinafter Nyquist 1].
In 1979, plaintiffs returned to the district court and convinced the court that a system-wide
remedy was required to ensure desegregation. Arthur v. Nyquist, 473 F. Supp. 830 (W.D.N.Y.
1979) [hereinafter Nyquist I1]; see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. In an effort to
fulfill the court's mandate to desegregate, defendant school board implemented a plan entitled
"Phase III" which the district court approved by court order. See infra notes 66-70 and accom-
panying text. Dissatisfied with Phase III, plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit. The circuit
court remanded without deciding the merits of the appeal citing the paucity of factual finding
concerning the relative successes of Phase III. Arthur v. Nyquist, 636 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.), on
remand, 514 F. Supp. 1133 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter Nyquist III]. The district court then
approved a revised school board plan called "Phase IIIx." Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp.
1133 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter Nyquist 111]; see infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
In 1981, the Buffalo's teachers union filed a motion alleging that the Board's plan to rem-
edy racial discrimination in staff hiring procedures violated provisions of New York Education
Law and breached a collective bargaining agreement. The court denied plaintiffs' motion, hold-
ing that the Board's implementation of the policy was undertaken in a good faith effort to
comply with the provisions of the remedial court order. Arthur v. Nyquist, 520 F. Supp. 961
(W.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984) [hereinafter Nyquist
IV]. At first, the Second Circuit dismissed defendants' appeal. Arthur v. Nyquist, 697 F.2d 287
(2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Nyquist IPJ. When the Second Circuit finally decided to hear the
appeal, it rejected two of the three challenges the teachers' union raised to the remedial plan.
The court did find, however, that the plan's treatment of laid-off probationary and permanent
teachers was unduly harsh. Arthur v. Nyquist, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafterNyquist
IVJ; see infra note 61.
Once the desegregation plan was fully implemented, conflicts over funding and budgeting
arose between the Board of Education and the mayor and Common Council. In 1982, the
school board returned to court, asking it to require the mayor and Common Council to appro-
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the task of desegregation not as a difficult chore, but rather as an opportunity
to create better schools and a better community in Buffalo.' Quoting the
words Tennyson had Ulysses use when exhorting his friends and followers,
Judge Curtin said: "Come my friends, 'tis not too late to seek a new world.",3
Almost ten years later, the New York Times noted that Buffalo is considered a
"national model of integration."4 There has been no white flight, and scores
on standardized achievement tests are up.5 Educators come from around the
world to see how the Buffalo school system works.6 This is an astonishing
phenomenon in a city which had been called "the most segregated city in the
Northeast,"7 and which had supported school board tactics designed to fur-
ther segregation within the school system for decades.
In the period between the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v.
Board of Education 8 and Judge Curtin's decision in 1976, many district courts
tried to follow the Court's mandate to desegregate, with varying degrees of
success. In Boston, for example, the district court's order to desegregate led to
years of intransigence and violence around the desegregation issue, while in
Denver, desegregation was largely peaceful. This Article will look at the ef-
forts of the district court judge in Buffalo to see specifically how he managed
the institutional reform of the schools so as to maximize the likelihood of
peaceful desegregation and productive integration. This Article will focus on
the judge's role in shaping and managing desegregation as a way of under-
priate more money for the plan. Agreeing with the Board, the district court ordered defendants
to appropriate an additional $7.4 billion to enable the board to comply with the court-ordered
desegregation plan. Arthur v. Nyquist, 547 F. Supp. 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 809
(2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 930 (1984) [hereinafter Nyquist Fl. The Second Circuit
upheld the district court's authority to order such additional appropriation. Arthur v. Nyquist,
712 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Nyquist I; see infra note 83 and accompanying text.
Discouraged with the pace of desegregation, plaintiffs filed a motion to require the Board of
Education to devise a new plan to increase the number of majority students at three elementary
schools. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion, finding that a further desegregation of
Buffalo's schools was not practicable, and that imposition of any new measures would be
counterproductive. Arthur v. Nyquist, 566 F. Supp. 511 (,.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter Nyquist
V11.
Finally, in 1985, the Board was again in conflict with the mayor and the Common Council
over funding. The district court had arranged for a magistrate to oversee these issues and
render reports and recommendations to the district court for approval. Plaintiffs and defend-
ants disagreed with several of the magistrate's findings and recommendations. The district
court agreed with the magistrate's report and recommendations and ordered the Board to sub-
mit a proposal for the budget. Arthur v. Nyquist, 618 F. Supp. 804 (V.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Nyquist Vii]. See generally infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
2. Transcript of proceedings held before Hon. John Curtin at 75-77 (July 9, 1976) [herein-
after Proceedings].
3. Id at 77-78.
4. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
5. d, at B4, col. 1; Rossell, The Buffalo Controlled Choice Plan, 22 URBAN EDUcA1 TIoN
328, 341-42, 348-49 (1987).
6. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1985, at B4, col. 1.
7. Address by Superintendent Eugene Reville, seminar lecture at Sociology Dept. at State
Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo at 2 (Mar. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Reville Tr.].
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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standing and assessing this process of social reform in Buffalo. It will also
look at the question of whether or not the judge has been successful at this
task. In particular, this Article will look at the various definitions of "suc-
cess" used by major actors in this process, and will analyze the relative "suc-
cess" of desegregation in Buffalo. Finally, this Article will present Judge
Curtin's role as an example of a new role for the judiciary in institutional
reform cases, a role which raises questions as to the court's competence and its
integrity. It will show how Judge Curtin addressed these problems in the pro-
cess of managing the reform of the school system. This Article will also dis-
cuss the relationship of his model of judicial action with the role of courts in a
democracy.
The first section, the history of Arthur v. Nyquist from the filing date in
1972 until 1988, provides a context, a set of facts which gives us the basic
material for the subsequent analyses of the desegregation process. The second
section looks at the role which Judge Curtin played over the years as he
shaped and managed the reform of the Buffalo Public School system in order
to bring it into line with the values of the Constitution. Three specific areas
where his role was crucial to the success of desegregation will be considered:
(1) the planning phase, where he re-focused the energy of the community to-
ward building a better school system and insisted on total community involve-
ment in that process; (2) setting the pace for desegregation in a way which
would maximize the outcome he sought; and (3) the personal role he has
played in actively monitoring the process so as to have sufficient information
to channel the restructuring process properly. The third section looks at the
role played by major institutional actors in Buffalo - the school board and
the religious community - in the desegregation process. This section sug-
gests that without the unwavering and interlocking support of these actors for
the judge's orders, it is unlikely that desegregation would have been as peace-
ful as it was.
Section four turns to the question of whether the result of the judge's long
intervention in restructuring the school system has been, as the New York
Times puts it, a "national model of integration."9 Has the integration of the
school system really been successful? What does "successful" mean in this
context? Does it mean that black school children are receiving a better educa-
tion? Does it mean that there is an improvement in interracial harmony? Or,
does it merely mean that black and white children are in the same school
buildings? This section will show how representatives of plaintiffs, the school
superintendent and Judge Curtin define "success," and how they view desegre-
gation in Buffalo in light of that definition."°
9. See supra note 4.
10. Guest speakers at the seminar sessions which launched this Article, see supra note *,
included the Honorable John Curtin, federal district court judge for the Western District of
New York; Eugene Reville, Superintendent of the Buffalo Public School System; Frank Mesiah,
representative of plaintiffs NAACP and Citizens Committee for Human Rights (CCHR) and
co-chair of CCHR; Marilyn Hochfield, who worked on the lawsuit in the liability phase, first as
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In section five, this Article addresses jurisprudential concerns which are
illuminated by an understanding of Judge Curtin's role in the Buffalo school
desegregation case. First, it looks at the framework of institutional reform
cases such as this one, and notes criticisms which suggest that the courts have
institutional constraints that make them less suited for this kind of work than
legislative or administrative bodies. It will then show how Judge Curtin ad-
dressed those institutional limits in this case in order to act effectively. Judge
Curtin's primary technique for meeting the inadequacies in the court system
involved reaching out to the community, bringing the community into the
decision-making process. This section will also address the question of
whether the technique Judge Curtin created is an example of John Ely's "par-
ticipation-oriented, representation-reinforcing" approach to judicial review, an
approach which, in Ely's view, harmonizes the goals of popular control and
egalitarianism in the judicial process.
I.
HISTORY OF ARTHUR v NYQUIsT
In 1972, the Buffalo branch of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People ("NAACP"), the Citizens' Council on Human Rela-
tions ("CCHR"), and various black and white parents in Buffalo joined to file
suit against the city and state for violations of the constitutional right of black
children to equal, thus, not segregated, education." When suit was filed, the
a law student volunteer, then as an attorney; and David Jay, counsel to plaintiffs during the
remedy phase of the litigation. Their comments were taped during these class visits and form
the basic material for this Article.
11. Although the NAACP was a named plaintiff in this suit, it was not as active in devel-
oping and pursuing this litigation as was the CCHR, a local interracial group which had been
formed in early 1963 to address civil rights problems in Buffalo. Address by Frank Mesiah,
representative of plaintiffs NAACP and CCHR and co-chair of CCHR, seminar lecture at Law
School at State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo at 3 (1987) [hereinafter Mesiah Tr. 1987]. Two of the
seminar speakers, Frank Mesiah and Marilyn Hochfield, were active in CCHR from its incep-
tion. IL at 4; see Address by Marilyn Hochfield, Attorney for plaintiffs, seminar lecture at Law
School at State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo at 6 (1987) [hereinafter Hochfield Tr.].
This was not the first time that black parents in Buffalo had taken formal steps to end the
segregation of the school system. In the 1840's, they petitioned the Common Council to allow
black children to attend the white schools, because of the poor education they were receiving in
the black schools. Although the Council recommended denial of admission to the black stu-
dents at that time, the schools were finally integrated in 1872 at the school superintendent's
request. See generally White, The Black Movement Against Jim Crow Education in Buffalo New
York 1800 - 1900, 30 PHYLON 375 (1969). However, the schools re-segregated over time.
In 1947, New York State enacted a law prohibiting segregation in the public schools. N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 3201 (McKinney 1970). Both the New York State Department of Education and
the State Board of Regents issued mandates requiring the integration of the public schools. U.S.
COMM. ON CIVIL RIGTS, CIVIL RIGHTS USA: BUFFALO 40 (1963); Nyquist I, 415 F. Supp. at
949-50. Relying on these mandates, in 1965, several black parents appealed to the state Com-
missioner of Education, charging that the Buffalo Public School System ("BPSS") was racially
imbalanced (particularly in the elementary schools); that the Board of Education ("Board")
refused to alleviate this racial imbalance; and that the BPSS discriminated in the recruitment
and placement of black teachers. Yerby Dixon Appeal, 4 EDuc. DEP'T REP. 115, 116 (1965).
Although the Commissioner held for plaintiffs on the first two claims, and ordered the desegre-
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Buffalo school system had 61,000 students, 45.8% of whom were black, La-
tino, Asian or Native American. 2 Out of seventy-seven elementary schools,
fifty-five were segregated; that is, they were over eighty percent minority or
majority. Similarly, five of the six middle schools, and seven of the thirteen
high schools were segregated.13
On April 30, 1976, Judge Curtin found that "the Board of Education, the
Superintendent of Schools, the Common Council, the Commissioner of Edu-
cation and the Board of Regents intentionally created and maintained, in sub-
stantial part, the segregation in the BPSS." 14 He found that whenever natural
integration appeared to be developing within the school system, the Board
acted in ways to hamper that effect. For example, BPSS allowed white stu-
dents to go to schools outside of their regular attendance zone when their
"home" school was predominantly black, for many spurious reasons, includ-
ing "fear of black children.""5 Similar transfers were granted to any student
who expressed a wish to study the Polish language, a language which was only
taught in certain predominantly white schools. 6 BPSS created "optional
zones," which allowed all students, black or white, to attend a school outside
of their normal attendance zone. However, because the population in these
gation of the Buffalo school system, id. at 116-19, little was done by the BPSS to remedy the
unlawful situation. Nyquist I, 415 F. Supp. at 957.
In 1966, the BPSS created a voluntary integration program, Quality Integrated Education
("QIE"), and started the one-way busing of some black junior-high school students into
predominantly white peripheral schools. Hochfield Tr., supra note 11, at 51. The Board also
stated at that time that white students would not be bused into black neighborhoods. Nyquist 1,
415 F. Supp. at 952. By 1968, 2000 black students - out of a total minority school-age popula-
tion of approximately 27,000 - were being bused from the inner-city to predominantly white
peripheral schools. Id. at 953. This step, however, was insufficient to provide a serious remedy.
Any desegregative effect was essentially nullified by the Board, which allowed some 2,000-4,000
white students to transfer from integrated schools to predominantly or all white schools to
avoid integration. Id. at 960.
In 1972, seven years after the State Commissioner of Education had ordered the BPSS to
integrate, he noted that Buffalo was more segregated than ever. Of a total of 96 schools, over 20
were more than 90% black and 29 were more than 90% white. Id. at 956. The Board appeared
intransigent with regard to the state mandate. When, in 1972, the Commissioner asked the
Board to develop a revised desegregation plan within two months, the Board informed the
Commissioner that it was unable to do so. Id. And when, in 1973, the Commissioner sent a
state task force into Buffalo to develop the plan for the city, the Board rejected those plans. Id.
at 957.
12. Nyquist I, 415 F. Supp. at 915.
13. Id. at 916.
14. Id. at 960. While the city defendants were found guilty of actively creating and main-
taining segregated schools, the state defendants were found guilty of failing to take steps to
eliminate the desegregation. Id. at 958-59, 961. In 1978, liability was affirmed as to the city
defendants, but reversed as to the state defendants. See supra note 1. This ruling was made in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which
required proof of segregative intent for liability for a constitutional violation. Nyquist 1, 573
F.2d at 146.
15. Nyquist 1, 415 F. Supp. at 936-39.
16. Id. at 926. The head of the Pupil-Personnel Department of the BPSS, Anthony Ge-
rard, stated at a deposition that the white students would line up in his office in August for
language transfers as if they were in a supermarket. Hochfield Tr., supra note 11, at 30-31.
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"optional zones" was predominantly white, the effect was to allow white stu-
dents to avoid going to school with black students in what would otherwise
have been an integrated school. 7 It also sited and re-districted schools to
create and maintain segregated schools.8
Once liability was established, Judge Curtin moved to the remedy phase
of the case. In June 1976, he conducted eight days of hearings about the de-
segregation plans proposed by the Board and by plaintiffs. He granted mo-
tions to intervene to a group representing latino students in the BPSS, to a
member of the Common Council who presented an alternative desegregation
plan, and to the Buffalo Teachers' Federation. He also received submissions
from parents and others in the community, which he made available to all
interested parties. 19
On July 9, 1976, Judge Curtin met with the parties to discuss the weak-
nesses in their respective proposed plans for desegregation, and to let the par-
ties know how he viewed the remedy phase.' He set as his goals the
elimination of racially identifiable schools21 and the integration of the staff."
Each school should reflect the majority-minority ratio for all schools in the
school district.23 School staff should be integrated immediately, and a plan for
minority recruitment developed.24 Judge Curtin pointed out that to eliminate
racially identifiable schools, a successful plan would have to include busing,"
but cautioned the parties that the burden of busing should be equalized be-
tween minority and majority students.26 Plans based on open enrollment or
freedom-of-choice could not be used.27 Judge Curtin provided an important
indication of the timing of the process when he stated that "in some ways we
can go forward and in some ways we ought to wait a little bit."28 With respect
to the realities of the desegregation process, Curtin pointed out that although
he could not consider the threat of white flight, he could consider record evi-
17. Nyquist I, 415 F. Supp. at 939-41.
18. Id at 924, 930-36.
19. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 14-15.
20. By the time Judge Curtin started the remedial process, the Supreme Court had already
created parameters for remedies in school desegregation cases. In Swann v. Board of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 23-25 (1971), the Court authorized the use of mathematical racial balance requirements
as a starting point to shape a remedy. It also authorized the use of remedial alteration ofschool
zones and busing as acceptable remedies. Id at 27-29. The Court's ruling that federal courts
may not impose a multi-district remedy for a single district dejure segregation problem, Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 718 (1974), meant that Judge Curtin would not be able to pull the
Buffalo suburbs into the remedy process.
21. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 17.
22. Id at 63-64.
23. Id at 54.
24. Id at 64.
25. Id at 19.
26. Id at 62.
27. Id at 20.
28. Id at 7. Indeed, the slow pace of the desegregation process ould bring plaintiffs into
court more than once. See supra note 1.
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dence that re-segregation was likely to occur under a proposed plan.29
The main thrust of defendant Board's plan ("Buffalo Plan Phase I") was
to close the all-black academic high school and to move those students out
into the predominantly white academic high schools, thereby integrating the
white schools. Ten other schools were to be closed and their students moved
to different schools as a way of increasing desegregation. Two magnet schools
were to be created within the black community. The hope was that these
specialized schools would have such outstanding programs that white parents
would voluntarily request that their children be bused into the black commu-
nity to attend them.a°
The court faulted the Board's plan because it would not effectively inte-
grate the BPSS. Its main impact would be felt at the high school level and
would have little or no impact at the junior high or elementary levels. 31 Under
this proposed plan, the number of white children in racially isolated schools
would drop twenty percent, while the number of minority children in racially
isolated schools would drop only 5.7%.32 The Board was ordered to devise a
plan that integrated the BPSS to the greatest extent possible.33 If its proposal
did not fully desegregate the system, defendant school board was obligated to
present hard evidence to explain why it could not meet this mandate.34
Having laid out guidelines for the remedy, Judge Curtin set forth an im-
portant theme for the viability of any proposed plan - the support of the
community. In his view, no plan would work if it could not garner the long-
term support of the community.35 A major criticism of the plans before the
court, therefore, was the absence of community input.36 Judge Curtin explic-
itly instructed the Board how to get such support. It was to solicit the views
of parents, teachers and community leaders in each school district at each step
of the planning process to get their ideas for the changes they would like to see
in their schools and how these changes should be implemented. 37 The Board
had a responsibility to listen to the common sense, practical views of parents
and teachers. 38 The court also directed the Board to ask for resources and
support from colleges and universities in the area, as well as from area busi-
ness and labor leaders, the local bar association, and other community lead-
ers.39 The judge also made it clear that the ideas of parents in the black
community would have to be heard and considered before there could be a
29. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 20-21.
30. Rossell, supra note 5, at 329; Nyquist V1, 566 F. Supp. at 513; interview with Marilyn
Hochfield, Attorney for plaintiffs, in Buffalo (Nov. 13, 1988) [hereinafter Hochfield Interview].
31. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 21-22.
32. Id. at 22.
33. Id. at 56.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id. at 36, 38.
37. Id. at 53-54, 58.
38. Id. at 74-75.
39. Id. at 68-69.
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final ruling on the acceptability of any plan." He pointed out that the com-
munity itself had an obligation to make its views known and to participate in
the construction of an integrated school system. 4'
Finally, noting the problem of monitoring compliance with the court or-
ders, the judge emphasized that "this court is not and does not want to be a
school administrator."'42 He asked the parties to suggest an appropriate per-
son to act as master during the remedy phase.43 He also requested suggestions
for community representatives from each school who could act as monitors.'
Judge Curtin concluded by saying that Buffalo could have one of the finest
school systems in the nation, "but it must first believe that it can.'"'" He urged
the community to take hold of that belief and come with him, as friends, "to
seek a new world."
Despite Judge Curtin's concern that the Board's plan (Phase I) did not go
far enough in desegregating the entire system, he allowed the BPSS to imple-
ment Phase I in September 1976, while it developed a more complete desegre-
gation plan to begin the next year.4 7 This first phase of court-ordered
desegregation went smoothly.48 Members of the religious community - min-
isters, priests, rabbis - rode the school buses the first days of desegregation to
ensure a peaceful transition.4 9 Following the judge's order, the school super-
intendent, Eugene Revile, sent teams to hundreds of meetings within the vari-
ous Buffalo communities to solicit their ideas for developing a system-wide
desegregation order."0 Reville personally attended many such meetings to dis-
40. Id at 39.
41. Id at 74-75.
42. Id. at 10.
43. lId at 59-60.
44. Iad at 67. In 1977, Curtin appointed a Citizens' Committee on School Desegregation.
Its tasks included gathering information on desegregation and bringing it to the attention of
responsible parties; facilitating citizen participation in the desegregation process; fostering pub-
lic awareness of desegregation; and encouraging cooperative efforts with local colleges, cultural
groups and the university. Nyquist I, No. 1972-325 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1977) (order ap-
pointing Citizen Commission to monitor implementation of desegregation). In 1979 he dis-
banded that committee. Nyquist II, No. 1972-325 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1979) (vacating order
that established Citizens Commission). Since that time, Carol Streiff, a para-legal working part-
time for plaintiffs, has been monitoring the process. Address by Attorney David Jay, seminar
lecture at SUNY Law School at 23 (1987) [hereinafter Jay Tr.].
45. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 77.
46. Id at 77-78.
47. Address by Honorable John Curtin, seminar lecture at Law School at State Univ. of
N.Y. at Buffalo at 10 (1987) [hereinafter Curtin Tr. 1987].
48. Hochfield recalls only one racial incident during the entire desegregation process.
That incident took place several weeks after the beginning of Phase I. White students milled
around outside their newly integrated high school, refusing to go inside, and threatening black
students who were being escorted into the school. The situation calmed down after a few days.
Hochfield Interview, supra note 30. There were undoubtedly other minor instances of hostility
which did not get the attention of the principal actors in this case.
49. R- Brooks, Influences of Buffalo Ministries on Integration 11-12 (1988) (unpublished
seminar paper).
50. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 26-27.
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cuss the desegregation order and plans for the future of the schools.5' Judge
Curtin was also intimately involved in the desegregation process. For six
years, he met with representatives of the parties at least once a week to ensure
that the planning process was proceeding along the lines he had set. 2 The
judge also let the community know that his office would be open to receive
individual complaints about the desegregation process, complaints which he
would ask the BPSS to resolve.53
In May 1977, the court approved Buffalo Plan Phase II, which was filed
by the Board in response to the court's direction to develop a more compre-
hensive plan for desegregation. 54 This plan contemplated the expansion of the
Quality Integrated Education ("QIE") program, created in 1966. Through
this new program, black parents could request that their children be bused out
of the inner-city, predominantly black schools to predominantly white schools
on the periphery of the city. Under this expanded QIE plan, each white
school would ultimately have a twenty percent minority population.55 Also,
under Phase II, four more schools were closed, and more magnet schools were
created in the black community.56 The black students who were displaced
when their neighborhood school was converted to a magnet were either trans-
ferred to another school in the neighborhood, kept on at the magnet, or trans-
ferred to a white school through the QIE program.-7 To the plaintiffs, this
plan seemed unfair. Only minority children had to move from their neighbor-
hood schools to get an integrated education.58 Further, over forty percent of
the black students enrolled in the QIE program made that "choice" because
they no longer had a neighborhood school to attend.5 9
On June 29, 1978, the court asked the parties to submit proposed findings
in response to the Supreme Court's mandate in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman 60 that the courts decide whether the segregative acts of the Board
"had a sufficiently widespread impact on the school system so as to justify the
51. Id.
52. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 13-14; Nyquist V, 547 F. Supp. at 469 n.1. These
meetings were informal ones, not on-the-record hearings in court. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note
47, at 13-14.
53. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 21.
54. The court also directed the Board to prepare an explanation of the changes for each
school affected by the order, and to distribute that explanation to the parents of each child in
that school. Nyquist I, No. 1972-325 (W.D.N.Y. May 4, 1977). He also required that each
notice state that "concerned parents may bring their objections to the court by filing a written
application to intervene." Id. at 11.
55. Nyquist V, 547 F. Supp. at 470. The number of minority students enrolled in the QIE
program in the first year of Phase II was approximately 3,000, up from 1,684 the previous year.
Rossell, supra note 5, at 339.
56. Nyquist V, 547 F. Supp. at 470.
57. Nyquist II, 473 F. Supp. at 840.
58. Id. at 840.
59. Id. at 840-47.
60. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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imposition of a system-wide remedy."'" On June 6, 1979, Judge Curtin held
that the scope of the remedy in Buffalo must be system-wide and ordered all of
the schools in the BPSS to be desegregated no later than the fall of 1980.1
Judge Curtin noted that only a partial remedy was in place through the QIE
program and the magnets, leaving fifteen all-minority schools. 63 Because the
QIE program was burdensome on black children, the victims of a constitu-
tional wrong, and because it was unmanageable and inefficient Judge Curtin
ordered that the QIE program be discontinued as soon as possible." Judge
Curtin also stated at this time that since the Buffalo school system was ap-
proximately fifty percent majority and fifty percent minority, he would con-
sider a school with a minority population between twenty-five percent and
sixty-five percent to be desegregated.65
On November 15, 1979, the Board filed Buffalo Plan Phase HI, which
drastically scaled-down the QIE program, created four new magnet schools
and closed ten more schools.6 Its most important innovation was the creation
of six Early Childhood Centers for pre-kindergarten through second grade.67
For two of these Centers, assignment was mandatory.68 For the other four,
61. Nyquist II, 473 F. Supp. at 832.
In Judge Curtin's order of March 24, 1979, the court addressed its concern that the Board
had taken inadequate steps to recruit minority teachers, principals and support staff as ordered
in 1976. As a result, the court imposed a "one-for-one hiring goal on the Board, to be continued
until the ratio of minority to majority personnel reflected the same ratio as in the general com-
munity." Nyquist IV, 520 F. Supp. at 963. In September of 1979, the Buffalo Teachers' Federa-
tion argued that the Board of Education violated state law by hiring teachers on a one-for-one
basis pursuant to the court order. Id The court disagreed, stating that "neither state law nor
contract law [could] be used as a defense when the result would be to impede a court-ordered
remedy for constitutional violations." Id Thus, the court ordered the Board to continue until
it met a goal of 21% minority teachers and staff. Id at 965-66. The Second Circuit upheld the
one-for-one hiring goal. Nyquist IV, 712 F.2d at 822-24. In 1981, unions representing various
professional and non-professional employees of BPSS were granted leave to intervene. See Ny-
quist IV, No. 1972-325C (W.D.N.Y. March 12, 1982) (order granting motion to intervene by
Buffalo Building Council); Nyquist IV, No. 1972-325 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 1982) (order granting
motions to intervene by various unions and the Buffalo Council of Supervisors and Administra-
tors). In April 1987 the intervenor representing disabled pupils in the BPSS asked the district
court to ease the one-for-one hiring order to allow white teachers to enter the tenure track. At
the same time, plaintiffs asked the court to order the Board to step up recruitment in order to
achieve its 21% goal. Buffalo News, Apr. 28, 1987, at B5, col. 5.
62. Nyquist II, 473 F. Supp. at 849-50. Judge Curtin found that the majority of Buffalo
schools were affected by defendant's acts. Many of the discriminatory policies, such as discrimi-
natory staff assignments, were applied on a system-wide basis. Even those acts which were
confined to a limited number of schools had an indirect effect on other schools, since changes in
one part of the system affected the rest of the system. Id. at 833. For example, discriminatory
transfers in the primary grades had extensive ramifications due to the feeder patterns to junior
and senior high schools. Id.
63. Id at 835.
64. Id at 840, 846-47.
65. Id at 848. On June 19, 1980, this guideline was changed to 30-65% minority students
for each elementary school. Each magnet school, however, was required to have a student
population which was 50% minority and 50% majority. Nyquist Pi, 566 F. Supp. at 514.
66. Rossell, supra note 5, at 339.
67. Id at 340.
68. Id
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there were no fixed assignments.69 Thus, at this phase, increased integration
would be achieved in part by fixed assignments and cross-busing. The court
approved Phase III in June and August 1980.70
Plaintiffs appealed the court's approval of this plan to the Second Circuit,
arguing that the district court had once again approved a constitutionally defi-
cient freedom-of-choice plan which did not accomplish system-wide desegre-
gation.7 On January 5, 1981, the Second Circuit remanded for more
comprehensive findings, stating that it could not tell whether the Board had
discharged its burden of coming forth with a plan that met constitutional stan-
dards.72 It also noted that this case had "dragged on too long."73 In response
to this concern, on January 27, 1981, the Board proposed an expedited Phase
III ("Phase IIIx") which would impose more fixed assignments as of Septem-
ber 1981, if voluntary measures had not achieved system-wide desegregation
by that time. The Board requested, however, that it be allowed to wait until
September 1982 to implement Phase IIIx.74
On May 19, 1981, Judge Curtin refused the request for a delay, and held
that since the Board seemed to have achieved the maximum success possible
by voluntary means,75 it was time for involuntary desegregation. He then or-
dered the Board to implement fixed assignments as of September 198176 in
order to achieve complete system-wide desegregation in conformity with the
dictates of Dayton, which required a system-wide remedy." Further, the de-
segregation was to conform with the standards laid out in Green v. County
School Board,7 8 which held freedom-of-choice plans unacceptable if there were
"reasonably available other ways.., promising speedier and more effective
conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system .... ."I' Despite concerns in
the community, the opening day of school was calm.8 0 Phase 1IIx continued
the generally peaceful desegregation process of previous years.81
Plaintiffs have returned to court many times since the implementation of
Phase IIIx in 1981 to raise issues concerning that implementation. One of
their major concerns has been the development of magnet schools, and how
they affect racial imbalance in the entire system, as well as the quality of edu-
69. Id.
70. See Nyquist 111, 514 F. Supp. at 1134.
71. Nyquist III, 636 F.2d at 906.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Nyquist III, 514 F. Supp. at 1135-36.
75. Id. at 1139.
76. Id. at 1141.
77. 433 U.S. 406 (1976).
78. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
79. Nyquist III, 514 F. Supp. at 1137 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 440-41).
80. Reville, Desegregation as a Tool for Establishing Quality Education, in BROWN PLUS
THIRTY: PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION, 63-64 (L.P. Miller ed. 1986).
81. Id. at 64; see also Address by Frank Mesiah, seminar lecture at Sociology Dept. at
State Univ. of N.Y. at Buffalo at 43 (1988) [hereinafter Mesiah Tr. 1988].
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cation in the non-magnet schools and programs.' 2
The Board, too, has gone before the court during this process, to request
adequate funding for the integration program. Buffalo's school system is de-
pendent on the Mayor and the Common Council for funding. On occasion,
they have refused to provide the Board with the full funding it requested. In
both 1981 and 1982, the Board asked Judge Curtin to order the City of Buffalo
to provide more funds to carry out his desegregation mandate. After a hear-
ing, Judge Curtin so ordered. 3
In 1984, as negotiations between the City and the Board for 1983-84
funding continued, Judge Curtin appointed a citizens' committee to negotiate
a budget with the city and the Board." When this committee was unable to
resolve the dispute, the judge appointed the Honorable Edmund F. Maxwell,
United States Magistrate, to serve as special master to hear the Board motions
on the 1983-84 and 1984-85 budgets."5 Magistrate Maxwell held fifty days of
hearings.8 6 On May 16, 1985, he filed his report with the court, recom-
mending that the Board be granted the amount it had requested for the 1983-
84 school year.87 Judge Curtin adopted the magistrate's findings and recom-
mendations on August 26, 1985.88 On June 22, 1988, the Board voted once
again to sue the Mayor and Common Council for an additional $15 million for
the 1988-89 school year. 9
In 1988, in a system with seventy-seven schools, only four of them were
still more than sixty-five percent minority, and thus, not within the guidelines
prescribed by the court for an integrated school.90 The magnet programs have
been successful in attracting parent interest.91 In 1987, there were over 12,000
82. See, ag., Nyquist VII, No. 1972-325C (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1986) (plaintiffs move to
enjoin the creation of two magnet high schools).
83. Nyquist V, 547 F. Supp. at 468-69, 474-77, 484. The City appealed the 1982 order to
the Second Circuit, which affirmed the lower court ruling. Nyquist V, 712 F.2d at 811. The
Second Circuit also noted "an unusual aspect of the case," which came when counsel for the
NAACP declined to defend the district court order to give additional funds to the Board,
although he had signed plaintiffs' brief urging affirmance of the order. It was his view that the
district court had not made sufficiently detailed findings to show that the entire amount of S7.4
million was needed to carry out its desegregation mandate. He decried the fact that school
boards around the country were requesting more money ostensibly for desegregation, yet used
the money to meet their own unmet education needs, when such demands incurred the wrath of
the local communities. The Second Circuit noted that this concern probably reflected the insti-
tutional concern of the national NAACP more than it did the litigating position of plaintiff
students. Id at 812-13.
84. Nyquist VT, No. 1972-325C (W.D.N.Y. April 10, 1984) (order appointing a Budget
Review Committee).
85. Nyquist VII, 618 F. Supp. at 806.
86. Id. at 808.
87. Idk at 809.
88. Id. at 811.
89. Buffalo News, June 23, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
90. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 3. This number has been challenged by plaintiffs as being
too low and based on a faulty analysis. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
91. Students are admitted to most magnet schools through a lottery system. Once a year
names are drawn from two drums - one for white students and one for minority students. The
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applicants for 2,500 spaces. 9 2 Before the integration process began, Buffalo
was ranked lowest among the five largest cities in New York State in reading
and mathematics test scores.9 3 In 1988, Buffalo ranked first out of the five.94
Within the past five years, fifteen of Buffalo's schools have been selected by the
State Commissioner of Education as "Schools of Excellence," more than any
other school district in the state, including New York City. 9 Five of Buffalo's
schools have won the national Secretary of Education awards. Four of those
were awarded in one year, more than were awarded any school system in the
country. Of those four, only one was a magnet school.
96
On March 26, 1987, the Board discussed whether it should petition the
court to declare the school system fully integrated, and to relinquish its juris-
diction over the case. In a five-to-three decision, the Board decided not to so
petition the court.9 7 Thus, Arthur v. Nyquist, which was filed in 1972 and
decided in 1976, is still under the jurisdiction of the court.
II.
THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN DESEGREGATING AND
INTEGRATING THE BUFFALO SCHOOLS
At the core of structural reform is the judge and his effort to give
meaning to our public values.98
Before the desegregation of the Buffalo school system began, the general
view in Buffalo was that the city would fail in its attempt to desegregate peace-
fully.99 There were predictions that Buffalo, a "hard-nosed, blue collar"
town, 1° would react to court-ordered desegregation as violently as Boston
had reacted to the same order only two years earlier.'01 The brutality with
which Bostonians fought desegregation was witnessed by television audiences
around the nation.10 2 Many people expected to witness the same in Buffalo, a
first names drawn are accepted in the special school. Because the student population in Buffalo
is approximately 50% white and 50% minority, the drawing continues until the racial balance
is achieved. In 1987, minority students constituted 55.6% of the total magnet school enroll-
ment of 13,965. Buffalo News, Feb. 21, 1987, at C5, col. 2.
92. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 29.
93. Buffalo News, Mar. 20, 1988, at B1, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. Telephone interview with Joseph Murray, Associate Superintendent of the BPSS (Dec.
28, 1988).
96. Buffalo News, June 30, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
97. Id., Mar. 26, 1987 at B1, col. 2.
98. Fiss, Foreword: The Forns of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979).
99. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 25.
100. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 15.
101. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 25.
102. In September and October 1974, the first year of court-ordered desegregation in Bos-
ton, school buses were stoned, one black bus driver was beaten, and the Ku Klux Klan
marched. J. Ross & W. BERG, "I RESPECTFULLY DISAGREE WITH THE JUDGE'S ORDER":
THE BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONTROVERSY 196, 204-208 (1981). There were beat-
ings, fights and vandalism throughout the city. Id. at 245. In South Boston High School, scv-
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city which, with its large working-class Irish, Italian and black neighbor-
hoods, all in well-defined ethnic communities, bore a striking resemblance to
Boston. But Buffalo did not explode into violence when the desegregation
process began. There was no community-wide refusal to obey the court order.
The question addressed in this section is, "how did Buffalo avoid the violence
of Boston?"
The success of Buffalo's desegregation effort can in large part be attrib-
uted to the role Judge Curtin played in shaping and managing the reform of
the Buffalo school system after issuing the liability decision. Institutional re-
form cases, which are exemplified by cases requiring the desegregation of
schools or the restructuring of prison systems, require judges to establish on-
going supervisory relationships with the targeted institutions. Not only must
the judges decide if a constitutional right has been violated, but they must also
monitor the shaping of the remedy to ensure that the institution is reformed in
a manner consonant with constitutional values. Unlike traditional cases,
where the judge's decree terminates her involvement in the case, in structural
reform cases, the decree prolongs and deepens the court's involvement in the
case.103 Thus, in Buffalo, after deciding that the schools had been segregated
in violation of the Constitution, Judge Curtin had to plan and monitor a reme-
dial process to ensure that the unconstitutional school segregation was elimi-
nated in the most efficacious and appropriate manner. This would involve him
in the remedy phase for over twelve years.
There are three areas where Judge Curtin's actions were crucial to the
successful desegregation and integration of the school system: (1) initial plan-
ning of the desegregation process; (2) setting the pace for desegregation; and
(3) monitoring the process of reforming the school system.
eral major fights occurred. In one case, a youth had to be hospitalized. Id. at 225. Racial slurs
were painted on buildings. Black students were "greeted" with chants and jeers, and bottles
were thrown at them. In one instance, when whites stoned buses taking black elementary stu-
dents home, eight of the students were injured. Id. at 197-98. In another incident, a crowd of
white protesters gathered near a local school and waited for school buses to drive by so that
they could jeer and chant at them. IML at 231. While the crowd waited, a car driven by a black
man drove by. The crowd forced the man to stop, pulled him from his car and beat him se-
verely. Id. at 232. On October 15th, a white student was stabbed during a fight between black
and white students. Id. at 257. That same day, the Governor mobilized the National Guard.
Id. at 260. Violence continued. In December 1974, there were fights at South Boston High,
which escalated into fighting between police and residents of South Boston. Fourteen police
were injured. Id. at 318.
In July and August 1975, the second year of desegregation, racial incidents proliferated.
Id. at 570. In the fall of 1979, a black football player was shot while playing a game in a white
section of the city. Id. at 673. This attack was followed by walk-outs and protests at several
schools and sporadic violence throughout the city. Id. These spates of violence and resistance
occurring five years after the 1974 decision to desegregate "suggest that the potential for racial
violence and political discontent [in Boston] was still quite high." Id at 673-74.
103. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1280,
1296-98 (1976).
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A. Initial Planning
Judge Curtin sent two unambiguous messages to the Buffalo community.
The first message was that the schools must be desegregated: this was re-
quired by the Constitution. The second message was that the success of deseg-
regation rested upon the involvement of the entire community. Pointing out,
"we're all in the same ship,""' the judge tried to persuade the citizens of
Buffalo to view the court order not as something mandatory with which they
must comply, but rather as an opportunity to build better schools and a better
community.
Although Judge Curtin eschewed any role for himself as a "school ad-
ministrator," he did note that he had visited many of the schools in an effort to
prepare himself for the remedy phase. Further, the judge alerted the public
that his office would be open to receive complaints about the desegregation
process. 105 He thus indicated that he was not setting himself apart from the
community which was going to be required to change in order to comply with
his order. He would be intimately involved in that process.
Judge Curtin's exhortation to the Board to enlist the support of all as-
pects of the community to plan the desegregation process - minority and
majority, professionals and parent groups - emphasized his theme that differ-
ent groups in the community should work together. In other words, Judge
Curtin set out to build community through the process of desegregation.10 6
He stated:
[T]his is a democracy where the best decisions are the ones in which
individual members of the community have the ability to... have
their views listened to and considered and considered seriously.
That is why I believe the community participation in the planning
stage is so important .... I believe the Board and the Commis-
sioner's staff and the Court have a responsibility to listen to the com-
mon sense practical views of the parents and the teachers and other
people who are involved in this very complicated process .... They
have insights which we cannot know about until we listen, and it is
not only within the spirit of the law, but it is in the spirit of the
United States as a democracy to listen to the views of all individuals
in the community.... I have directed that that be done, and I insist
that that shall be done....
There are several reasons why Judge Curtin proceeded in this fashion.
104. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 23.
105. Id. at 21.
106. Cf Lukas, Beyond Yonkers: Cracking Gilded Ghettos, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1988, at
A25, col. 2 (describing the situation in Yonkers, N.Y. where the judge imposed crippling finan-
cial sanctions on both the city and city council members after their two year refusal to vote for
medium-income public housing after a finding of constitutional violation: "Yonkers reached
this impasse because its politicians failed to wrench community out of diversity").
107. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 73-74.
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First, this model fits his notion of how to get people to do what you want them
to do. In his view, "... the more you have to do things by orders, of course,
the more difficult it becomes. So you try to accomplish it by cooperation."1 °
Keeping people talking to each other is an important element of this process.
As Judge Curtin noted later: ".... [I]n any... community, you are going to
have people who agree wholeheartedly and... people on the other side who
are going to disagree. But we were able to talk it all out, to keep talking about
it, to try to work out a practical solution to the problem."'' 9 Sending the
Board into the community to discuss desegregation was also important be-
cause it gave those who were angry about the desegregation a chance to vent
their anger in a relatively controlled setting. °10 In addition, it is likely that
Judge Curtin recognized that his community participation model would in-
duce the city's elites to assume leadership roles in the desegregation process.
As Hochfield noted, there were other cities, such as Columbus, Ohio, where
the mayor exercised leadership on the desegregation issues, and set a positive
tone for the compliance process. This kind of leadership from the executive
branch was not forthcoming in Buffalo. "The judge... tried to poke people to
provide it," Hochfield stated. "We all did."' n I
B. Setting the Pace
Another message the judge sent in the early planning stages concerned
the timing of the pace of desegregation. At the initial meeting with the parties
on the acceptability of their respective desegregation plans, he stated, "we are
at a particular point in our journey and... in some ways we can go forward
and in some ways we ought to wait a little bit."' 17 To the extent that the judge
was indicating that he would not order complete integration immediately, he
was using timing as a tool to elicit successful compliance with his order to
desegregate. Judge Curtin later stated that he knew that the first desegrega-
tion plan (Phase 1) was so limited in scope that it could not "pass muster" if
appealed. He felt, however, that approval of the plan was appropriate since he
had a promise of a better plan from BPSS for the next year.1 1 3 The judge
thought it important to get some kind of remedy in place right away, even
though it was not the "perfect" remedy. "If you wait for the perfect remedy,"
108. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 4.
109. IdL
110. Address by Honorable John Curtin, seminar lecture at Sociology Dept. at SUNY at
24 (Feb. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Curtin Tr. 1988].
111. Hochfield Tr., supra note 11, at 44. The U.S. Civil Rights Commission has suggested
that desegregation in Boston was hampered by "virtually a total lack of public and private
leadership," as well as the fact that the judge initially made no effort to involve communities
affected by the order in working on the process. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FILLING
THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW: DESEGREGATION IN THE NATION'S PUBUC SCHOOLS
18, 20 (1976). It was only in the second year of court-ordered desegregation that the court
made an effort to involve the affected communities and local leaders in the process. Id. at 21.
112. Proceedings, supra note 2, at 7.
113. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 10.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1989-90]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
he stated, "you might have to wait eight, ten years in the future.... ,114
In the ensuing months and years, as plaintiffs became more and more
aggravated by the slow pace of desegregation, the judge "kept his fingers
crossed" that an appellate court would not fore him to order immediate sys-
tem-wide integration. As he later remarked: "I knew ... we couldn't do it
the first year or the second year; I knew it would take time."' 15 Judge Curtin
was convinced that if the desegregation process moved too quickly it would
fall apart.116 It is Curtin's view that one of the worst things a judge can do is
to give an order that cannot be obeyed for practical reasons. 1' 7 In Buffalo's
case, he thought that the Board would need time to deal with practical issues
such as creating a busing program, arranging lunch programs and moving
school equipment. 1 ' Curtin also thought that it would take time to explain to
the community what was going to be done and time to allay the fears of both
white and black parents about issues such as transportation and the safety of
their children.119 A slow desegregation process allowed for some parents who
were newly involved in desegregation to become comfortable with the changes
in the schools and to tell their friends that the new system was working
well. 120
The message Judge Curtin sent to the community, therefore, was that the
schools would be integrated, but not necessarily immediately. Although plain-
tiffs viewed this as a travesty of the Supreme Court's mandate that school
boards come forward with a plan "that promises realistically to work now," 12 1
in Curtin's view, the slow, piecemeal approach was necessary to achieve the
ultimate goal of peaceful and complete integration.
It has been suggested that a court order, such as Judge Curtin's, is more
easily accepted within a community to the extent that the order enforces so-
cially accepted norms. 122 Curtin's control of the pace of desegregation is an
example of this and helps explain why desegregation was largely peaceful in
Buffalo. Curtin's court orders gave the Buffalo community a chance to adjust
slowly to a new norm of racially integrated schooling. The specific instances
of desegregation efforts in Buffalo illustrate this theory.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 43-44.
116. Id.
117. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 10.
118. Id. at 11-12.
119. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 13.
120. Id. at 43.
121. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in original).
122. H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, COERCION TO COMPLIANCE 6-7 (1976). I have found
it helpful to think about that data in terms of variables which play a role in determining
whether there will be compliance with a law or court decision. See generally id. at 1-7, 123-30.
These factors include the responses of the elite to the law; the substance of the law (will it be
considered a benefit or a burden? how extensive is the expected change?); the social and polit-
ical characteristics of those affected (does the law enforce socially accepted norms?); the nature
of the decision-makers (do they agree with the law?); and the quality of enforcement (are the
sanctions clear? are they severe?).
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Before the liability decision in 1976, there was already some integration
within the school system - small-scale, one-way busing of black school chil-
dren from the inner-city to peripheral white schools under the voluntary
"QIE" program. The first step of court-ordered desegregation, Phase I, did
not demand marked social change beyond the QIE program. Under Phase I,
black students were moved from the black academic high school to white high
schools and two magnet schools were created in the black community to at-
tract white volunteers. Since Phase I required the white community to accept
not much more than what it had already come to accept under the pre-deci-
sion desegregation plan, perhaps the court order to implement Phase I was in
fact an order to enforce a socially acceptable norm.
Although Phase II in 1977 and Phase III in 1980 did not propose com-
plete system-wide desegregation, they did mark further steps towards system-
wide desegregation which were proposed by the Board and accepted by the
Judge. It was not until 1981, when the Second Circuit noted its concern about
the slow pace of desegregation in Buffalo, 23 that the Board implemented
"fixed assignments," that is, the forced busing of white school children to
black neighborhoods as a means of achieving system-wide desegregation of the
city's schools. 24
Thus, at each step of the way, the white community had an opportunity
to acclimate itself to an increased level of integration within the school system.
When forced busing became a reality, five years after the initial order to deseg-
regate, that order probably did enforce a socially acceptable norm. On the
other hand, had the order been issued five years earlier, it is likely that it
would not have enforced a socially acceptable norm, and the community
would have shown greater resistance. Controlling the pace of desegregation
also controlled the amount of normative change that was expected and thus,
allowed the incremental change of the normative behavior of the white
community.1 25
C. Monitoring the Reform Process
There are many methods a court might use to monitor the remedy pro-
123. Nyquist III, 636 F.2d at 906.
124. Reville, supra note 80, at 63.
125. Cf. Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW AND POLICY 355,
376 (1987): "While there is indeed order in the social world - order conceived in culture and
realized in the interlinked structures of behavior - it is contingent order, subject to reconcep-
tion and restructuring through purposive political interaction."
In Boston, Judge Garrity decided the liability issue on June 21, 1974. SHEEHAN, THE
BOSTON SCHOOL INTEGRATION DISPUTE: SOCIAL CHANGE AND LEGAL MANEUVERS 98
(1984). In September of the same year, out of a student population of 94,000, 45,000 students
were transferred to other schools, 18,235 of them by bus. Id. at 100. By the next year, the
number of students bused increased to 20,447. J. Ross & W. BERG, supra note 102, at 644. By
contrast, in Buffalo, during the first year of desegregation (Phase I), out of a total student popu-
lation of 57,235, the BPSS bused only 3,305 students. The next year, in Phase II, out of a
student population of 53,764, the BPSS bused 8,350 students. Phone interview with Kathleen
Shriver, BPSS paralegal (June 22, 1989).
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cess. It might appoint a master or hire an expert to oversee the process; it
might appoint a committee; or it might rely on the parties to call problems to
its attention. Judge Curtin used a variety of methods in the twelve year reme-
dial phase of the case. He initially considered appointing a master to take over
the task of managing the re-structuring of the school system but decided not
to. In his view, such a person would be "a stranger,... he wouldn't really
understand the personalities involved, the history involved, the details ....
And it seemed to me that since we were getting good, willing cooperation that
this was not needed." '126 Judge Curtin also feared that a master would start
giving orders to school officials, thus creating the possibility that two conflict-
ing messages would be sent from the court.1 27
Instead, Judge Curtin created a citizens' commission to monitor compli-
ance and report back to him. He appointed a variety of people to the commis-
sion including those who supported the plan, some opposed to it, others
neutral, labor leaders, housewives, former teachers and people from different
neighborhoods in the city. The commission made a number of suggestions to
the court, some of which he adopted. As the judge later stated, "it was a
process of community involvement, and I thought it was more important to
keep people like this involved than to bring in some outside expert."'128
After several years, Judge Curtin closed down the citizens' monitoring
committee because he felt that it was developing an inflated view of its impor-
tance and power and becoming "heavy-handed." '29 He decided that a better
system would allow parents in the community to make complaints directly to
him.'30 In his view, "every parent of every student" is appointed to monitor
the desegregation process. 3 In 1987, Judge Curtin described this monitoring
system:
[I]n this community... my office is open. We have repeated this
again and again that if you have a complaint, you can send me a
note. And we will have a meeting with people in the school depart-
ment and they will do something about it. Now in the early stages of
the case I had many complaints, and we worked at it.... Maybe
three months ago I had a complaint. I think there was a situation
where the youngster wanted to transfer to another school and the
Board said for some reason no. I said well, look into it. And they
looked into it. And I didn't hear anything more about it. I don't get
many complaints [now]. So that means to me that parents are satis-
fied, and it is working.' 3 2
126. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 27.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 28.
129. Id. at 30-31.
130. Id.
131. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 38.
132. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 21.
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Judge Curtin's primary method of monitoring the process, however, was
personal contact with the parties. He met with representatives of plaintiffs'
groups and the Board at least once a week for more than six years after the
liability ruling to ensure that the planning process was proceeding along the
lines the court had set.133 Curtin later explained the nature of these meetings
and their importance to successful desegregation:
This wouldn't be hearings in court, wouldn't be part of the trial pro-
cess, but it was most important. A lot of people say, 'well, judge,
you shouldn't do that,' but on the other hand I don't know how else
we could have worked out the problems without that kind of talking
through the problem .... Without doing that there would be a com-
plete logjam.134
It was Judge Curtin's view that some neutral party had to be at those
early meetings to work out conflicts between the parties as to the remedy and
that it was important that he play that role.1 35 Curtin noted that judges in
school desegregation cases differ on the degree to which they are willing to get
involved in the operation of the school system. Judge Curtin determined that
the court must get into the daily workings of the institution. Not only must
the court ensure that the system is being reshaped in a manner consonant with
his orders and with constitutional values, but it must also arbitrate disputes
between the parties as they occur.136 He continued: "And this is sort of a
strange place for a court to be. The judge becomes arbitrator,... he becomes
confidant... it helps him if he can be an expert in psychology." 137
The role Judge Curtin played in the desegregation and integration of the
Buffalo public school system was important to any successes that can be
claimed. His requirement that community support be gained by involving the
community in the desegregation process, and giving the community time to
adjust to the process in small increments were undoubtedly key factors in ex-
plaining why desegregation in Buffalo was peaceful. Judge Curtin's insistence
that the community know, that it had access to him and that he wanted to
consider the community's views in rendering his decisions must have made the
community feel less impotent in the face of unsettling and unwanted changes
in its social structure. Finally, Judge Curtin's active, hands-on involvement
with the parties enabled him to gain immediate feedback regarding problems
in the restructuring process, thus facilitating his arbitration of disputes be-
tween the parties about the appropriateness of particular elements of the rem-
edy.138 Thus, we can see that in the three important areas - insistence on
133. Id. at 13-14; Nyquist V, 547 F. Supp. at 469 n.1.
134. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 14.
135. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 16.
136. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 2.
137. Id
138. When asked if he contacted judges in other school desegregation cases in order to
determine how to set up the compliance process in Buffalo, Judge Curtin stated that he had
communicated with the judge who handled the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case in North Carolina
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community participation, control of the pace of desegregation, and direct and
constant monitoring - the role Judge Curtin chose to play was crucial to any
successful outcome in Buffalo.
This creativity and flexibility were important. Ross and Berg note that in
Boston, Judge Garrity had an "iron hand at the helm" approach to desegrega-
tion which might have been viewed as arrogant and arbitrary, thus leaving the
judge less able to work with the different actors in this process. 139 They com-
pare how he "played" his role, with how an actor interprets a script:
Theatrical actors are judged not only on how well they follow their
parts but also on how well they interpret their roles. That is, on
their ability to add meaning to the script and to give dimension to
the character.[sic] In some forms of drama, good actors innovate
creatively in their parts, developing roles in a way that are at the
same time both consistent with and different from the parts envi-
sioned by the play-write.[sic] "Actors during the Boston school de-
segregation controversy in the early stages were distinguished by
their inability to improvise and provide new meanings to the
drama." 1"
III.
IMPORTANT SUPPORT OF THE JUDGE'S ORDERS BY MAJOR
INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS
Judge Curtin's plan for the remedy phase, his pacing of desegregation,
and his close oversight of the reform process were crucial to the success of the
desegregation effort. It is unlikely, however, that desegregation would have
been so peaceful without the strong support of key actors within the commu-
nity. This section will discuss the responses of the school superintendent and
the religious community to the judge's initial order to desegregate.
First, this section will show that Eugene Reville, Superintendent of the
BPSS, followed the directions of the court to get community involvement by
organizing community meetings. These meetings were an opportunity to ex-
plain how the judge could coerce compliance, as well as an occasion to en-
courage people to think about how they could use the desegregation process as
an opportunity to improve the school system. This section will also show the
strong response of the Catholic Bishop of the Buffalo diocese, who not only
announced his support for the judge's order, but also refused to allow the
parochial schools to be used as a haven for those wishing to escape desegrega-
and others. He explained, however, that their solutions would have had little value in Buffalo
because each remedy had to be closely tailored to the individual nature of the community. Id.
at 6-7. In Curtin's view, differences in leadership, history, economic structure, and the school
funding process, for example, required that the desegregation process be handled differently.
Id.
139. J. Ross & W. BERG, supra note 102, at 689.
140. Id. at 689-90 (citation omitted).
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tion. A newly formed interdenominational group of clergy also supported the
judge's order by organizing groups to explain the order to their communities
and by riding the buses with school children during the first days of desegrega-
tion. This section will also show the media's positive tone concerning desegre-
gation. Finally, this section will conclude that the strong and interlocking
support of these major actors played an important role in the peaceful desegre-
gation of the Buffalo schools. 4 '
A. Response and Support of Eugene Reville and the
Buffalo Board of Education
Judge Curtin's orders were directed at the Buffalo Board of Education,
defendants in the suit. It was the Board which was ordered to go out into the
community to discuss the judge's order and to get ideas from the community
on how best to implement that order. The school superintendent's response to
the judge's mandate would therefore have great bearing on the likelihood of
successful compliance with the court order.
In 1976, the superintendent of the BPSS was Eugene Reville, a former
Buffalo school teacher and principal, whose first and major task as superinten-
dent would be to carry out the desegregation mandate. Reville believed that it
would have been impossible to persuade the white community to integrate the
schools based on the notion of righting a wrong, or of remedying a constitu-
tional violation. 142 He would have to offer the white community a better edu-
cation as a reason for modifying the school system.
As Judge Curtin directed, Reville went out into the community and at-
tended hundreds of meetings at which the school superintendent developed
several themes. The first message Reville sent was that "we had to obey the
court."143 He refused to spend time criticizing or defending the judge.
Reville's point was that the judge had a constitutional responsibility to carry
out and that there was nothing the community could do about that."4 Revile
also sent an important message to the community as to what sanctions were
available to the court if the community refused to comply with the order to
desegregate. And indeed, how could the judge's order be enforced? Should
the judge hold the Board in contempt? Even if he did, that speaks only to the
issue of compliance by the Board, not by citizens within the community.
Reville had an answer. He stated that when white community groups
expressed anger about the judge's ruling and asked why they should obey him,
Reville answered: "He can call in the 101st Airborne." 4 ' Thus, the recollec-
tion of President Eisenhower's strong response to the refusal of the Governor
141. There were undoubtedly other people less visible than these, who played an important
role in the desegregation process. Further research is needed to identify them and to explore
their contribution.
142. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 26.
143. Id. at 27.
144. Id.
145. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
1989-90]
REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
of Arkansas to protect the nine black students who integrated Little Rock
High School in 1957, was used as a powerful compliance tool.146
Reville also gave the community an important message of what they did
have the power to do, and that was to come up with ideas for school programs
that they wanted for their children.147 He attempted to get each group fo-
cused on creating a plan. Reville stated that he was able to use some proposals
but not others. And after studying the suggestions made by the community,
the BPSS returned to the community association with a plan of what it was
going to do. 14
8
To the extent that the BPSS was able to use part of the suggested plan,
the community had a sense of ownership of a part of the desegregation process
and would aid in that process in order to bring its part of the plan to fruition.
Although the community plans could not all be used, it was important for the
community to know that its concerns were at least being listened to and that
an opportunity was available to express its anger about the desegregation man-
date to a public official. The message Reville sent, then, was that the views of
the people who were being affected by desegregation mattered; the court and
the Board were not just going to ride rough-shod over them. The message,
ultimately, was about power. The community would have some control over
its destiny and over its schools. Even if a particular community was not able
to get the school plan that it wanted, at least it had the power to make the
powerful pay attention without resorting to violence to get that attention.
146. As the first step in court-ordered desegregation, 15 black children were to be enrolled
in Little Rock Central High School, which had a white enrollment of approximately 2,000. W.
RECORD & J. RECORD, LrrLE ROCK, USA 35 (1960). On September 4, 1957, acting pursuant
to the orders of Governor Faubus, the National Guard ringed Central High school and refused
to allow the black students to enter. Id. at 40-41. On September 20th, Faubus withdrew the
National Guard in response to a federal court order enjoining him from using the National
Guard to obstruct the judicial process. Id. at 56. On Monday, September 23rd, "a howling,
shrieking" mob outside and disorderly students inside the school forced school authorities to
withdraw the black students from the school, only three and a half hours after they entered it.
Id. at 59. On that same day, President Eisenhower issued an emergency proclamation com-
manding all those obstructing justice in Little Rock to "cease and desist and disperse," and
threatened to use whatever force was necessary to enforce the court order. Id. at 64. On Sep-
tember 24th, as a mob gathered in front of the school again despite his emergency proclamation,
President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National Guard, and flew 1,000 members of the
327th Airborne Battle Group of the 101st Airborne Division into Little Rock from Fort Camp-
bell, Kentucky. Id. The next day nine black students attended their first full day of classes at
Central High School under the protection of federal troops. Id. at 78-79. President Eisenhower
released the National Guardsmen from duty on May 8, 1958. Id. at 94.
The example of the desegregation furor in Boston provided an even more immediate and
potent statement of what would happen if Buffalo decided not to comply with the judge's or-
ders. Even before the liability opinion was handed down, there were articles in the local Buffalo
newspapers asking whether Buffalo would explode as did Boston, with arson, property destruc-
tion and deaths. As one Buffalo minister later stated: "We feared the worst, after what hap-
pened in Boston. We did not want Buffalo to be torn apart by violence." R. Brooks, supra note
49, at 3. Thus, the fear that Buffalo might end up like Boston provided a strong incentive to
obey the court order.
147. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 27.
148. Id. at 27-28.
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Finally, Reville might well have noted in these meetings that there would
be federal funds available to aid the BPSS in its desegregation effort. 14 9 This
news, to a city which suffered a serious economic decline due to the loss of
heavy industry, 5 ' must have looked like a blessing in disguise. A fresh influx
of money would enable the city to create new and exciting programs for both
white and black school children.
In a sense, then, the white community would be receiving a new and
updated school system as a reward for its decades of mean-spirited, segrega-
tive acts against the black community.151 To the extent that social change
takes place, however, the oppressor group must get something in exchange for
what it feels it is losing, which was, in this case, segregated schools as a symbol
of the inferiority of the black community and the superiority of the white
community. 152
B. Response and Support of Religious Leaders
The reaction of religious leaders was another significant factor. Even
before Judge Curtin issued his order, certain of the city's religious leaders pre-
pared themselves for desegregation. First, they talked to the religious leaders
in Boston to learn from that city's mistakes. Second, they formed the Buffalo
Area Metropolitan Ministries ("BAMM"), an interdenominational and inter-
racial council, to address social issues in the community. The first issue on
BAMM's agenda was school integration.1 53
Because Buffalo is a predominantly Catholic city,'" a positive response
from the Bishop towards desegregation was essential. That message was im-
149. Buffalo has been very successful in obtaining federal funds to assist in school desegre-
gation, largely due to the efforts of Jack Kemp, former Republican representative from the
Buffalo area, and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.). Id. at 46. Buffalo has received
more federal funding for desegregation than any other school district in the country. Id.
150. See M. GOLDMAN, HIGH HOPES: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF BUFFALO, NEW
YORK 267-77 (1983). Because of this economic decline, between 1950 and 1980 Buffalo's popu-
lation declined from 532,000 to 357,000. IA at 284.
151. The irony of "rewarding" those who refuse to make much needed social change is not
confined to the field of discrimination. For example, in the area of environmental protection,
the huge federal grant program for sewage treatment plants in the 1972 Clean Water Act, see 33
U.S.C. §§ 1281-99 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), was effectively a reward to municipalities and states
which had neglected the pollution for decades, because local politicians were unwilling to tax
their constituents for this purpose. My thanks to Barry Boyer for this observation.
152. See H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 122, at 3-5, 124 (discussing the "cost/
benefit" theory); see also Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AMi. . Soc. 597 (1958).
Even when the oppressor group gets some benefit for its illegal acts, as an incentive to allow
the illegality to be remedied, it is not uncommon for some members of that group to want all
the benefits, even to the extent of denying them to the group which suffered from the illegal acts.
See, eg., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979), wherein the employer and
union jointly created a special craft training program for both white and black employees in
order to remedy the historic exclusion of blacks from craft unions and one white employee
claimed he should receive a trainee position from the half allotted to black employees.
153. R. Brooks, supra note 49, at 5.
154. At the time when court-ordered desegregation was beginning, Buffalo was 65% Cath-
olic. The Catholic community was concentrated in South Buffalo, which was predominantly
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mediate and unambiguous. Only six days after the liability opinion was
handed down, Bishop Head pledged his support for the order. 1" BAMM
pledged its support a few days later.156 Soon thereafter, Bishop Head stated in
an article in a local Catholic journal that the Diocese of Buffalo would not
allow the parochial school system to become a refuge for "white flight" from
the public schools.157 White parents would not be able to avoid the desegrega-
tion in the public schools by transferring their children to parochial schools.
The superintendent of the Buffalo Catholic school system, Monsignor Ryan,
imposed and enforced strict guidelines for entrance into the local Catholic
schools in order to carry out this directive. As Monsignor Ryan stated, "we
were determined to cooperate with the spirit of Judge Curtin's order and not
to become a receiving facility for intercity white flight."'' 5 8
Also, in the summer of 1976, Bishop Head sent letters to every parish in
Western New York to be read at service in every Catholic church stating that
the Diocese of Buffalo was committed to quality integrated education, and
that it was the responsibility of the church to help achieve that goal. "The
church," he wrote, "conscious of her mandate from the Lord and striving to
promote the Gospel message, must be one of the principal actors in the urban
drama that is being played out in the cities across this nation."' 1 9 As Bishop
Troutman now recalls, all Catholic priests were urged to preach the message
of Christian love as it related to the issue of school integration.'6
As this was going on within the Catholic religious community, BAMM
developed two strategies to facilitate the process of integration. First, it held
meetings in churches and temples within the area to educate the public as to
the desegregation process.161 The second strategy was for BAMM members
- ministers, rabbis and priests - to ride the school buses and walk to the
schools with the children during the first days of integration. Many BAMM
participants wore their clergy collars so that the children would behave calmly
and to deter any confrontations or violence.162 Thus, the message sent by the
Irish, and in the Polish and Italian communities, located on the east and west sides of Buffalo
respectively. Id. at 4.
155. Id. at 7-8.
156. Id. at 8. BAMM included members of the Catholic clergy. Id. at 5.
157. Id. at 14.
158. Id. at 14-15. In Judge Curtin's view, the Catholic church followed through on this
commitment. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 37-38.
159. R. Brooks, supra note 49, at 16.
160. Id. It is interesting to note that the initial response of the Catholic Church in Boston
was much the same as that in Buffalo. The Boston Archbishop sent pastoral letters supporting
busing to achieve desegregation and announced that it would restrict transfers from public to
parochial schools. D. GARTH TAYLOR, PUBLIC OPINION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE
BOSTON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONFLICT 102-103 (1986). This early attempt at moral
leadership, however, did not prevail within the church constituency. Id. at 103-23; see infra
note 175. The fact that Bishop Medeiros had come to Boston very soon before the court order
to desegregate, and that he was Boston's first non-Irish-American Bishop in more than 125
years, must have weakened considerably his influence in this matter. Id. at 108.
161. R. Brooks, supra note 49, at 11-12.
162. Id. at 12.
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Buffalo religious community as a whole included several important compo-
nents: whole-hearted support by the clergy for the desegregation effort; active
participation in the effort by the clergy; and statements by the clergy that the
judge's order to desegregate could, and should, be embraced within the tenets
of their religion.163
C. Interlocking and Mutual Support of
These Institutional Actors
The extent to which the key players - plaintiffs, school superintendent,
judge, clergy - worked together for compliance in Buffalo is also important.
Judge Curtin noted in his opinion that plaintiffs' and defendants' cooperation
with each other could be seen in the fact that there were 161 stipulated facts,
which facilitated trial of the case.164 Judge Curtin also held weekly meetings
with plaintiffs and the Board for the first several years after the liability deci-
sion to lend his offices to facilitate the compliance process. Similarly, he
opened his office to complainants in order to facilitate communication be-
tween disaffected citizens and the BPSS 1 6s The school principals asked minis-
ters and priests to come to their schools at the'close of day to deter violence. ' "
And, as Curtin noted, even when the Board voted against a desegregation plan
proposed by the superintendent, Board members did not try to organize the
opposition if they lost. 67
Even now, the key players are able to see the contributions of the other
players, and give them credit for the peaceful integration of the schools.
David Jay, counsel for plaintiffs during part of the remedy phase, although
still dissatisfied with the way that the schools are being integrated, gives the
Board credit for defusing a very strong racist response among certain seg-
ments of the white community by giving jobs to some of the most vociferous
163. One might also see the media as a major actor in the desegregation process. Through
its editorials and reporting policy, it influenced the public response to the desegregation process.
According to Judge Curtin, the media was very helpful. Although he thought that the Buffalo
News had been more positive than the Courier, in his view both of Buffalo's daily newspapers
"approached the problem with a good deal of common sense." Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47,
at 36. On several occasions the Buffalo News printed the whole court order, so that the public
could know why certain decisions were made. And, although the Courier sometimes repre-
sented a particular neighborhood interest, it was never negative. Id at 36-37. Curtin also noted
that the radio and television stations provided free time to announce the time and place to apply
to magnet schools. Id. at 37. Further research is needed to develop and clarify the role of the
media in this process.
164. Nyquist I, 415 F. Supp. at 910.
165. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 13-14.
166. R. Brooks, supra note 49, at 12.
167. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 29. The fact that many players managed to work
together should not be read to conceal the very real tensions and hostilities which existed.
Many of their statements show that it was difficult for plaintiffs and the Board to work together
without the judge's presence and willingness to arbitrate disputes. These statements also indi-
cate that there were many complaints within the community, that the school principals feared
violence, and that the Board was not unanimous in its support of the desegregation plans.
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anti-busing forces in Buffalo.16
Monsignor Ryan, superintendent of the Catholic school system in the Di-
ocese of Buffalo, and Eugene Revile, superintendent of the BPSS, were in
daily contact during the early period of desegregation to discuss their mutual
concerns.169 Monsignor Ryan identifies the "expert detailed" planning of
Reville and Joseph Murray, the Assistant Superintendent of the BPSS, as the
single most important factor in getting peaceful compliance.7 0 Rev. Arm-
strong, another member of BAMM, thinks Joseph Murray and Judge Curtin
were the most important players - Curtin, because he was careful not to try
to run the schools, and Murray, because he put the plan together.171 Arm-
strong also notes the importance of the parents in planning the integration
process and sees them as key actors in this drama. 172 Thus, there is a sense in
the community of having accomplished something very important together.
Perhaps this unique cooperation developed because, in one sense, plain-
tiffs and the defendant Board have been on the same side in this case. One
scholar has suggested that institutional reform cases are often successfully liti-
gated because the plaintiffs and the defendants really want the same result. 173
In this case, it is clear that plaintiffs have been on the same side as the defend-
ant Board whenever the Board has asked Judge Curtin to order the Mayor
and Common Council to make available money for desegregation.1 74 And
clearly they are on the same side now, as both parties find it beneficial to be
under the jurisdiction of the court. Plaintiffs want the court as a powerful ally
in their continuing argument with the BPSS over how best to provide quality,
integrated education to black school children. Similarly, the Board wants the
court as a powerful ally in its continuing struggle with the Mayor and Com-
mon Council for adequate school funding.
The major actors sent strong messages of support as individuals, and as
representatives of major institutions. Undoubtedly, their individual messages
were strengthened by the interlocking support they provided each other, by
the support of the media and by the united front they presented to the commu-
nity. 175 It is less clear, however, why they acted this way. It was perhaps a
168. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 24. This Article focuses on the principal actors in the
desegregation process and the nature of the messages they sent to the community about that
process. Further research is needed into the nature of the various communities in Buffalo which
received those messages, and the social, political or economic characteristics of those communi-
ties that made peaceful desegregation possible.
169. R. Brooks, supra note 49, at 13-14.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Id. at 17-18.
172. Id. at 18.
173. Levine, The Role of the Special Master in Institutional Reform Litigation: A Case
Study, 8 LAW & POLICY 275, 292, 307 (1986). I thank Prof. Adeline Levine for this insight and
this reference.
174. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 22; Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 44.
175. Inconsistent messages and messages of non-support for the court order of desegrega-
tion undoubtedly played a role in creating or enhancing community defiance of that order in
Boston. The mayor's public statements, some of which suggested that it was legitimate for
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change
[Vol. XVII: 119
BUFFALO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
result of their personalities, or their sense of what was good for the commu-
nity, or of what was possible in the community. In the view of Marilyn
Hochield, a member of plaintiffs' legal team, "the people and the times, and
the conjunction of the people and the time, is what produces social change."1 76
In 1976, with respect to the process of peaceful school desegregation, Buffalo
simply hit the right "conjunction of the people and the times.'"r
IV.
How SUCCESSFUL HAS THE JUDGE BEEN IN THE INTEGRATION
OF THE SCHOOLS?
All of the parties involved in this suit are clear that the schools were
peacefully desegregated, and that that in itself is worthy of notice and praise.
There is disagreement, however, on whether integration has been as success-
ful. There is also disagreement as to what one means by "successful." This
section will address that question by looking at the definitions of "success" of
four of the five actors interviewed: Judge Curtin, the school superintendent, a
representative of plaintiff organizations, and one of plaintiffs' attorneys.
Through their responses, we will see that the definition of success varies ac-
cording to one's mandate, one's constituency, and possibly, one's race. This
section will then further emphasize the contingent nature of "success," by
showing how unexpected factors impinge on the remedy process and how
hard-won gains can be lost. It will look at the comments of seminar students
who visited classes in the BPSS to assess what was taking place in the desegre-
gated schools. We will see that, despite many positive changes, an underlying
white parents to boycott the schools, served only to confuse the public as to their obligations
under the court order. D. TAYLOR, supra note 160, at 138-43. When the mayor asked Presi-
dent Ford to send the United States marshalls into Boston to control violent demonstrations,
President Ford refused, stating that he disagreed with the court order to desegregate. Id. at
135. As the desegregation process continued, the church leadership in Boston weakened its
resolve to block white ffight to parochial schools. The church also changed its pro-busing posi-
tion to one urging non-violent protest against busing. Id. at 103, 110-11.
Judge Curtin suggested that desegregation was more acceptable eventually in Buffalo than
in Boston because of the racial integration in the steel mills which provided jobs for so many
citizens of Buffalo up until the 1970s. It was his view that, despite the racial discrimination in
those mills, the white workers at least had the experience of working alongside black workers,
thus decreasing the social distance between the two groups. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at
22-24. Judge Curtin, his father and brothers all worked in the steel mills. Id. at 23.
These suggestions as to why Boston and Buffalo reacted differently to court-ordered deseg-
regation focus on the nature of the response of major institutional actors to the court order and
the nature of the community which was obligated to change its social structure in response to
that order. Further research in this area would provide important information on the varied
responses to court-ordered change.
176. Hochfield Tr., supra note 11, at 2.
177. The fact that the major players were all born and raised in Buffalo must have also
been an important factor. Judge Curtin and Eugene Reville, School Superintendent, were both
raised in largely Irish-Catholic South Buffalo; Joseph Murray, Assistant Superintendent, was
raised in the Riverside section of Buffalo; and Frank Mesiah was raised in the west side of the
city. They each had an insider's knowledge of the social and political structure of the commu-
nity, a necessary element in easing racial tensions during the desegregation process.
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racism within the desegregated schools still has a negative impact on black
students. Desegregation may have brought more limited benefits than plain-
tiffs had anticipated. Finally, this section will conclude by pointing out that
little is accomplished by modifying one aspect of the social structure if the
underlying dynamic of racism remains untouched.
We start this section by returning to the initial issue of defining "success":
what does it mean? Does it merely mean peaceful compliance with the court
orders to desegregate? One way to look at this question is to ask the purpose
of the litigation: was it to improve the quality of education for black school
children, to improve racial harmony within the community, or to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of "equal protection of the laws?"
In order to find out the purpose of the litigation, one could ask plaintiffs
what they wanted when they filed suit, and whether or not they obtained what
they wanted. In cases such as this, however, which involve class actions and
institutional plaintiffs such as CCHR and the NAACP, there would probably
be as many answers to that question as there are members of the groups.
Nonetheless, in an effort to address this issue, the question was put to Frank
Mesiah, present and one-time past co-chair of CCHR and an officer of the
NAACP, thus a representative of both institutional plaintiffs in the suit.
Mesiah was clear. Black parents wanted equity for black school children,
and they did not get it. 78 In his view, it was wrong for the court to allow the
defendant Board to create the plan for desegregation. As he stated, it was like
"leaving the evacuation of the wounded to those who shot them down."'179
The Board created a plan that would appeal to the white community to gain
its cooperation in desegregation, instead of one that appealed to the black
community, the victim of a constitutional wrong.'80
Mesiah also argued that equity for black school children was not
achieved because desegregation was based on the concept of magnet schools.
This concept merely succeeded in creating a new kind of elite class within the
school system - those students in magnet schools and programs.181  Not
only is a two-tier system perpetuated, he argued, but the system draws middle
class students and parents who are attracted by magnet schools and programs
away from the non-magnets."' 2 Left in the remaining schools, therefore, are
students who are achieving below grade level in reading and mathematics, and
who are not getting the support services they need. As a result, in the black
student population in non-magnet programs and schools there is a dispropor-
tionately high drop-out rate, high suspension rate, and high rate of referral to
178. Mesiah Tr. 1988, supra note 81, at 20.
179. Mesiah Tr. 1987, supra note 11, at 5.
180. Id.
181. Mesiah calls magnet schools "the Cadillacs of the system." Id. at 7.
182. Id. at 12-13. Magnet programs ("mini-magnets") are specialized programs operating
within neighborhood schools. For example, at Bennett High School, there are "mini-magnets"
in computer science, law, and international studies. Buffalo News, Jan. 27, 1986, at B5, col. 1.
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special education classes."8 3 According to Mesiah, although those black stu-
dents in the magnet programs and magnet schools are probably happy, and
have benefitted from desegregation,1 8 4 each school should be a "special"
school, and each school child should be taught to his or her top potential."8 5
It is a system, he added, which keeps students apart, thinking that one group
is better than the others, instead of keeping them together, and looking at
what they have in common.1 8 6
Finally, Mesiah stated that the BPSS still teaches a racist, eurocentric
curriculum. In his view, too many people view desegregation as "black kids
becoming whiter, instead of white kids becoming blacker." 8 7 As long as that
view persists, racial mixing by mere percentages achieves little: "desegrega-
tion... is more thanjust a mixing of bodies."'8 8 In conclusion, Mesiah stated
that he has seen no progress within the community in terms of social aware-
ness or better relations between black and white.189 Maybe things would be
different, he thought, if there had been more struggle after the court order.
Maybe there would have been a different kind of change. 90 But the magnet
school plans defused the angry energy of plaintiffs, and no other options were
seriously considered. 9 '
David Jay, counsel to plaintiffs during the remedy phase of the litigation,
reiterated Mesiah's concern about the impact of the magnet school solution on
the problem of segregation:
Forget about Montessori and the Performing Arts, and all the
stuff that is all wonderful, and looks great in the press, and you bring
in some Congressman or Senator to declare the school a wonderful
school, but what about the rest of them? Many of us believe that
those frills are being given to those particular schools at the expense
183. Mesiah Tr. 1987, supra note 11, at 12, 16. Mesiah notes that in the category "severly
mentally retarded," where there is no question as to the appropriateness of the identification,
black children are represented in roughly the same proportion as in the general population. In
his view, this highlights the over-referral of black school children to special education classes.
Id at 28-29.
Scholars have noted the existence of these "second-generation" desegregation problems
which face black children in integrated schools. Along with those noted by Mesiah, they in-
clude re-segregation within the school through "tracking" by ability; self-segregation; dispro-
portionate suspension, truancy and drop-out rates; eurocentric curriculum; and biased
counselling about colleges and vocational training. BERRY & BLASSINGAME, LoNG MEMORY:
THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 281-83 (1982); HUGHES, GORDON & HILlMAN, DE-
SEGREGATING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 141-48 (1980); HAWLEY, CRAIN, ROSSELL, SMYIE, FER-
NANDEZ, SCHOFIELD, TOMPKINS, TRENT, ZLOTNICK, STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE
DESEGREGATION 97-135 (1983).
184. Mesiah Tr. 1987, supra note 11, at 19.
185. Id at 26.
186. Id at 26-27.
187. Id. at 29.
188. Id
189. Id at 30.
190. Id at 17.
191. Id at 17-18.
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of others. We would much rather see.., all the test scores going
up .... 192
Magnet schools, the cream of the crop will go to the magnet
schools. It is for them. Everybody else gets something less.193
Another problem Jay saw with the magnet schools was the reliance on
federal funding for the programs. His concern was that once the school sys-
tem was considered "unitary,"' 94 and the federal government no longer pro-
vided money for the desegregation effort, the more expensive magnet schools
and programs would drain city money from the rest of the system.1 95 When
asked specifically what plaintiffs wanted, he answered, "that every child in this
city, white or black, have a decent education, and an integrated education.
That is what we want. That is all we have ever wanted." 196
Jay admitted that some parts of the school system are excellent 1 97 and
that school integration has benefited the whole city. 198 He was convinced that
if things had stayed the same, "we would have had wars going on in this
city."199 But he pointed out continuing problems plaintiffs have faced during
the remedy phase. First, as of the spring of 1987, there were still eight schools
with a minority enrollment exceeding sixty-five percent, thus violating the
court guidelines for an acceptable level of integration. °° A second concern
was a failure to hire minority teachers sufficient to meet the one-for-one hiring
order imposed by Judge Curtin in 1979.201 In Jay's view, the BPSS recruit-
ment effort was inadequate with respect to both effort and funding.20 2 In fact,
Jay wondered why the BPSS requires that teaching applicants with valid
teaching certificates pass a series of tests before they are eligible for hire, when
the poor showing of minority candidates on one of the tests makes the task of
192. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 16.
193. Id. at 17.
194. "Unitary" means in full compliance with the mandate of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971).
195. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 24.
196. Id. at 15-16.
197. Id. at 3.
198. Id. at 26. At another point, Jay stated that he had not seen much change in social
relations between the races as a result of desegregation. Id. at 13. Perhaps this apparent contra-
diction in Jay's analysis of whether school desegregation has been "successful," was merely a
reflection of his sense that some things are better because of desegregation, but not as many as
he would have liked.
199. Id. at 26.
200. Id. at 27. In September 1988, Jay announced that ten schools had a minority enroll.
ment between 70% and 91% in the 1987-88 school year, in violation of the court's order that
minority enrollment not exceed 65% in any one school. Thus, the trend towards integration is
lessening, and resegregation of the BPSS is taking place. Buffalo News, Sept. 10, 1988, at Al,
col. 5. School Superintendent Reville responded that part of the problem is the inclusion of
latinos as a minority group, especially since latinos are the fastest growing population group in
Buffalo. Id.
201. See supra note 61.
202. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 4.
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recruiting black teachers more difficult.3 Although a state statute requires
cities over 400,000 to give a pre-eligibility examination,z ' as of the 1980 cen-
sus, Buffalo had only 365,000 people, and was no longer governed by that
statute.
205
Jay also pointed out that plaintiffs have asked the BPSS to produce stu-
dent achievement test score data broken out by race for more than one year.
Despite the court's order that such data be provided to plaintiffs, the BPSS
had not yet produced the data.206 Jay's response to the BPSS statement that it
could not provide plaintiffs with that data because it does not keep test scores
by race, was "humbug!"" 7 Jay found it difficult to believe that a school sys-
tem with the computer capability of the BPSS which had been working on a
school desegregation remedy for eleven years, would be unable to retrieve
standardized test scores categorized by race for all its students. 03 In fact,
Superintendent Reville stated in 1988 that black students were closing the gap
with white students with respect to standardized test scores,2°9 suggesting that
such information was available to BPSS, but not to plaintiffs. Thus, if one is
measuring "success" by improved reading and mathematics skills for black
students as shown by their scores on standardized tests, plaintiffs cannot now
determine if school desegregation has been "successful."2 "
Eugene Reville, school superintendent of the BPSS since 1975, faced a set
of problems which differed from those of the plaintiffs and which, therefore,
would shape his definition of "success." First, he would have to devise educa-
tional programs that were so attractive that the white community would ac-
cede to desegregation rather than flee the BPSS. The programs would have to
be so attractive that white parents would even be willing to bus their children
into the black community to attend school.21I As he later noted: "Parents are
free agents. If they don't like the schools you have, they are not going to keep
203. Id. In 1986, nearly 75% of the minorities who took the Buffalo teachers' exam failed
it. Buffalo News, Jan. 21, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
204. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2573 (10-a) (McKinney 1982).
205. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 6.
206. Iad at 18-19.
207. Id at 19.
208. Id.
209. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 16-17.
il0. Jay also pointed out that plaintiffs have only one person, Carol Streiff, working part-
time to monitor compliance with the court order. Despite the excellence of Streiff's work,
plaintiffs compared this to the situation in Cleveland, where the judge created a monitoring
system with a full-time staff. Jay Tr., supra note 44, at 23. As Jay suggested, it is almost
impossible for one part-time person to know what is going on in a quarter-billion dollar opera-
tion. Id-
211. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 26. For this reason, Reville decided to put all of the
magnets in the black community. Id at 10-11. Only one magnet school is now located in the
white community. Idk at 20-21.
In this regard, Revile stated only that there cannot be a successful desegregation program
if there are not enough middle-class students. Id at 14-15. While this might be true with
respect to a "successful" desegregation program, there will be no desegregation program at all if
the white parents flee the city school system.
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them in those schools. They are going to move. '  BPSS had to provide
attractive alternatives and a better education. Thus, Reville had to ensure that
the physical fact of desegregation could actually take place, before moving on
to address what went on in the newly integrat6d schools.
When Reville was asked how he measured "success" for purposes of the
integration effort, he listed several indicia. Regarding the court's thirty to
sixty-five percent ratio for racial balance, he stated that as of March 1988, only
four schools were out of balance, (i.e., over sixty-five percent of the population
was minority or non-minority), and that he expected one of them, a newly
created science magnet, to become racially balanced shortly.21 3 Thus, he saw
the BPSS as successful in calming fears in the white community sufficiently to
make desegregation a fact. With respect to what was taking place in the newly
integrated schools, Reville pointed out that standardized test scores in reading
and mathematics for all students in Buffalo have increased since 1976.
Although black students are not performing as well as white students, "they
are closing the gap." '214 In terms of the disproportionate drop-out rate for
black youth, the percentage differential between drop-out rates of white and
black youth has decreased from nineteen percent to less than one percent since
the 1973-74 school year.2 15 Reville also pointed to the numerous awards given
to Buffalo schools by national and state commissioners of education, as a testi-
mony to the positive effect of school integration on the entire system.2 16
Reville saw all of these improvements as a direct outcome of the desegre-
gation effort. The court order to change the system and the money made
available for desegregation efforts allowed him to make the changes needed to
improve the quality of education overall. In his view, without the court man-
date to integrate, "you couldn't do in Buffalo in 100 years what we did in five
years," due to the inertia of a very large and entrenched bureaucratic
system.
21 7
212. Id. at 15.
213. But see supra at note 200.
214. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 16. Again, this indicates that BPSS does keep test scores
broken out by race so as to assess the progress of black children in newly integrated schools.
Reville's comment, however, shows that he was comparing the wrong pools of students. If one
wants to determine whether black school children are learning better in integrated schools, their
progress should be compared to the progress of black children who are not in integrated
schools. H. RODGERS & L. BULLOCK, supra note 122, at 149. By making the comparison
between white and black children in integrated schools, Reville made his task harder. Inte-
grated schooling is then required to compensate for all the other social handicaps imposed on
black children and their families. Expecting black school children who suffer social disabilities
which white children do not suffer, to achieve in school in the same way, is an expectation
which will not be fulfilled. It probably was, however, what Reville's constituency expected him
to achieve. Thus, in political terms, he probably did make the right comparison.
215. Plaintiffs argue that the drop-out rate for black students is 48.4% and 42.6% for
white students. Thus, plaintiffs have argued that the drop-out rates of white and black youth
have decreased to a six percent differential and not a one percent differential as claimed by
Reville. Buffalo News, July 2, 1986, at B2, col. 1.
216. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 19-20.
217. Id. at 20.
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Reville also believes that another positive result of the city-wide desegre-
gation effort was improved relations between the races. He told of a recent
meeting with white parents who wanted the Early Childhood Center which
their children were attending to be extended through the third grade."1 8
Reville pointed out that if that change were made, they would have to bus
their children into the black community another year. The parents' answer to
Reville was laughter. They told him that they "had gotten over that stuff." ' 9
Reville believes strongly that the task of integrating the schools has just
begun. He emphasized that one has to work on integration constantly:
Just because you integrate the schools doesn't mean that you have
gotten rid of racism .... [I]t's within the school system.... So you
have got to talk to the teachers about their own attitudes [about
race] .... I believe, that in a school system you have got to work on
integration constantly. I call it the unfinished business. Because
we've racially balanced our schools doesn't mean that we have
solved the problem. The major problem is ahead. 0
We've desegregated, and now we've got to integrate the schools by
concerning ourselves with whether or not there's true integration in
the schools, and whether or not the victims of the discrimination are
having their education improved. And that, in the final analysis, is
the most important thing that we do."
Addressing the charges that the magnet schools the BPSS created to fos-
ter integration had brought a new form of elitism to the Buffalo schools,
Reville stated: "You have got to start somewhere with a touch of quality."
After that, "you can bring the entire district up."' When principals of non-
magnet schools argued with the Board that "magnets get everything and we
get the leftovers," Reville asked them: "What are you going to do about it?
What kind of programs do you want to develop in your school to attract stu-
dents back, and generate excitement? '  To the question of whether all
schools, magnet and non-magnet alike, received roughly the same resources,
he responded that resources in the school system are allocated much as they
are to the children in a family, that is, based on need. "People argue that
every school should get the same. That will never be true, and it never should
be the same. Handicapped kids will get more, kids with reading problems will
get more, vocational schools will get more."" 4 Reville also stated that his
office had tried to address the disproportionately high rates of suspension and
218. Id at 50-51.
219. Id at 51.
220. Id at 38-39.
221. Id at 44-45.
222. Id at 34. Rossell claims that "there is no dual system of elite magnets and mediocre
regular schools" in Buffalo, based on her analysis of standardized reading and math scores for
magnet and regular schools over a ten-year period. Rossell, supra note 5, at 349-51.
223. Id at 35.
224. Ia at 45.
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referral to special education of black school children by creating two task
forces to look into the causes for those high rates and to make recommenda-
tions for eliminating them.22
When Judge Curtin was asked whether school desegregation was "suc-
cessful" here, he prefaced his remarks by stating that in his view, "Americans
have a very short concentration period ... they want to have immediate re-
sults." '226 He continued:
They said, "Well, we have integrated your schools and that was two
years ago and now the youngsters in the second grade, how are their
reading scores now... ?" The trouble with all of this business is
that it is a long process .... But I think to say that... right away,
after two of three years, "well it really hasn't upped the educational
scores," I think that is sort of foolish. Because maybe it doesn't
make any difference whether you do or you don't... The essential
thing is that... [the] citizens in our country... should have fair and
225. Id. at 41. In December 1986, Reville asked me to become a member of the Superin-
tendent's Task Force on Handicapping Conditions, which would address the problem of the
disporportionate number of black students being referred to special education classes. The data
showed that in the BPSS, a school system with a student body which is approximately half-
white and half-black, half-male and half-female, the following referrals took place in the 1985-
86 school year:
minority males 625
minority females 300
majority males 448
majority females 135
SUPERINTENDENT'S TASK FORCE, BUFFALO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, REPORT OF THE SUPERINTEN-
DENT'S TASK FORCE ON HANDICAPPING CONDITIONS 15 (June, 1987).
The eight person Task Force included parents of disabled children, special education spe-
cialists within the BPSS, community activists, and the chairman of the Exceptional Education
Department of a local college. Id. at 1-2. The Task Force set as its goals: (1) to determine why
there was a disproportionate referral of black students to special education classes, and (2) to
determine strategies to remedy the problem. Id. at 1. In order to do this, the Task Force
reviewed the current situation in the BPSS through staff interviews with school teachers and
principals, reviewed current research literature on the issue, held open hearings in the commu-
nity and reviewed the legal restraints on special education placements. Id. at 3-4. The Task
Force recommendations were presented to the Superintendent in June 1987. Those recommen-
dations emphasized the creation and implementation of procedures designed to address emerg-
ing learning problems through alternative techniques, prior to a formal referral to special
education. This would include providing additional special education supervisors to serve as
resource persons for regular education teachers. Id. at 66-70. The Task Force reconvened in
March 1988, to assess the progress of the BPSS on those recommendations. Letter from
Rasheeda Seabrook and Maria Kerber, Co-Chairpersons Superintendent's Task Force on Hand-
icapping Conditions, to Superintendent Eugene Reville (Mar. 25, 1988).
The Superintendent's Task Force on Suspensions issued its follow-up report on the recom-
mendations made in June 1987. It noted with approval that there was close to a 50% reduction
in the number of suspensions during the first 20 weeks in 1988, as compared with the same
period in 1987, and suggested further efforts by the BPSS, including improved procedures for
suspension, and strengthening parent-school relations. Letter from Dr. William B. Bennett,
Chairperson, Superintendent's Task Force on Suspensions, to Superintendent Eugene Reville
(May 19, 1988).
226. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 39.
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equal treatment, whether they are in schools or whether they are in
the workplace or doing anything else in our communal life.'?
The definition of "success" thus varies depending on one's mandate and
one's constituency. Judge Curtin, who, as a federal judge, was sworn to up-
hold the Constitution, suggested that the vindication of constitutional rights
was of primary importance. Plaintiffs' representatives offered slightly different
definitions of "success." Mesiah, who is a black and an officer of the NAACP
as well as CCHR, focused on equity to black schoolchildren in a non-racist
setting. Jay, a white attorney representing plaintiffs, said he wanted to see a
rise in all the test scores; he wanted a decent, integrated, education for all
school children, both black and white. And, Superintendent Reville saw "suc-
cess" in terms of his two major tasks: first, to ensure the physical desegrega-
tion of the schools, and then, to improve the quality of education for black
school children within those schools.
"Success" can also mean non-racist teacher-student and student-student
interactions and a nonracist curriculum in an integrated setting. To measure
these factors, students from the two seminars visited individual schools in the
BPSS and reported on what they saw.22 Their overwhelming response was
that the classrooms were indeed integrated numerically; that the teachers in-
teracted with black and white students in much the same way; and that pic-
tures on bulletin boards in halls and classrooms were racially mixed. In areas
where unstructured activity was allowed, halls and lunch rooms, groups of
227. Id
228. See supra note *. Reville invited the seminar students to visit any school at any time.
He asked only that arrangements be made in advance to ensure that they would not arrive on,
for example, a testing day. Kathy Shriver from the BPSS was most helpful in arranging these
visits.
In the spring of 1987 and 1988, thirty students from the seminar, including both law stu-
dents and graduate students in other disciplines, visited schools in Buffalo. They made their
own selections as to which school they wanted to see. Some wanted to see the much-praised
magnet schools, some went back to schools they had attended as children, and some went to the
neighborhood schools their children attended. They reported on a total of five high schools and
fifteen schools for lower grades. Some went with another classmate, some went alone.
This was not a controlled social science study, but a collection of perceptions of what was
going on in the school system by interested observers who had all been in the lower grades at
one time, and who are all involved, as white or black students, in the on-going study of race
relations in this country.
We asked the students to think about the following questions during their visits: (1) Is the
school integrated? How is it integrated? Note the racial configuration of classroom, school;
note extent of integration in non-structured settings, such as halls, library, lunchroom; (2) What
is going on in the integrated setting? Does it foster positive relations between majority and
minority students? Does it create a good learning situation for minority students? (3) How does
the teacher relate to majority and minority students? (a) Note, for example, who gets called on
more in class, who gets called on for the easy and the hard question; note whether the teacher
stands near some students - in a controlling way or in a supportive way; does the teacher wait
longer for an answer from some students? (b) Note also the textbooks: are different kinds of
people portrayed in the textbooks? How are minorities portrayed? and (4) Does the ph)lical
setting foster a good learning situation for minority students? Note material on bulletin boards,
walls; note magazines and books on display in library and classrooms.
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students were sometimes mixed, sometimes not. All reports indicated, how-
ever, that there was more self-segregation by race after the seventh grade than
before, no matter where the students were. At one high school, the black
students entered by one door, and the white students by another. With respect
to seating within the classrooms, there appeared to be little segregation,
whether by the teachers or by the students.229 The seminar students also
noted that the teachers were predominantly white, and the teachers' aides
largely minority. They pointed out, however, that there were black principals
at a few of the schools they visited. 211
They found other situations worthy of note. One seminar student was
struck by the fact that in the seventh grade science class she visited, the
teacher asked one black girl who had completed her assignment early to help
two white girls who were having difficulty with the work.23' Another was
surprised to notice that at one school assembly not only did the students sit in
fairly integrated groups, but the performances were completely integrated, to
the extent that one skit had a "mother" with both black and white "children,"
and another had a black student portraying Abraham Lincoln.232 Admittedly,
the social mandate at the post-puberty level (jr. high-high school), to not en-
gage in interracial dating is stronger than the social mandate to engage in
interracial activities in the school, and leads to more self-segregation by race.
Yet, the above analysis of the seminar students' collected data suggested that
there is a good deal of integration going on in the BPSS.
It must be remembered, however, that the seminar students saw only the
most superficial interactions between students and teachers, and even then,
had little sense of how their presence distorted that interaction. With such a
cursory visit, they were not able to determine whether the teaching fostered a
good sense of self among the black students, enabled white students to learn
about blacks and their culture in a positive way, or merely reinforced stereo-
types. The seminar students did, however, notice the racial configuration of
the power structure within the school they visited: the principals and teachers
were predominantly white. As one commentator noted, "if the experience of
desegregation only confirms the relationship of the powerful to the powerless
in intergroups relations, the goals of integration have not been achieved. ' 233
Looking at the notion of "success" from another angle, however, it is
229. This might be because the seminar students visited more elementary than junior high
or high schools, and all noted the remarkable lack of self-segregation at the lower levels. See S.
Faherty, Report on School Visit, Mar. 2, 1988 (unpublished seminar report); K. Miller, Report
on School Visit, Mar. 2, 1988 (unpublished seminar report).
230. In school year 1987-88, 20.7% of the teachers and principals in the BPSS were minor-
ity, and 79.3% were majority. In 1986-87, the numbers were approximately the same. In both
years, approximately half of the teachers' aides were minority and half majority. Phone inter-
view with Shriver, supra note 125.
231. K. Miller, supra note 229.
232. S. Faherty, supra note 229.
233. Cohen, Design and Redesign of the Desegregated School: Problems of Status, Power
and Conflict, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 260 (Stephan & Feagin eds. 1980).
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almost foolhardy to ask if desegregation was successful. Desegregation is a
continuous process, and the answer to that question will surely change over
the life of that process. As Judge Curtin noted, one is always working with "a
constant[ly] changing target."" 4 Unexpected factors and competing interests
will impinge on the process. For example, federal and state laws which re-
quire the integration of disabled and non-disabled students ("mainstream-
ing")235 have had an unexpected impact on the desegregation process in
Buffalo. To the extent that the desegregation order requires a certain racial
balance in the schools, that balance must be calculated with the inclusion of
the disabled also in mind. This complicated pupil assignments since disabled
students are both white and black, yet only certain schools are accessible to
students in wheel-chairs.236
The question of resources is also relevant here. A consent order in An-
dres v. Reville requires a certain number of professional staff and supervisors
for the program to teach the trainable mentally retarded.3 7 Should the lim-
ited money available to the Board go towards programs for the disabled or
towards the desegregation effort? Similarly, plans created to remedy racial
segregation may work against that very goal and have to be re-adjusted. For
example, if one of the goals of school desegregation is inter-racial harmony,
busing students to achieve integration will work against that goal, where the
buses leave right after school, and where school functions with important op-
portunities for positive inter-racial activities such as clubs, sports, and theater,
are held after school." 8
Solutions thus create new problems to be addressed. Solutions also create
new constituencies for change. For example, the major constituency for the
initial desegregation was the black community. Once the schools were physi-
cally integrated, and magnet schools and programs were in place, the constitu-
ency changed to those black parents whose children were not reaping benefits
from the initial changes. This group included at various times the parents of
those black school children not in magnet programs, parents of those in spe-
cial education classes and the parents of black school children who were sus-
pended or who dropped out of school. Thus, the presence of an institutional
plaintiff such as the NAACP or CCHR, which maintains continuing pressure
for whatever changed goals might be necessary, is crucial.
It is also clear that hard-won progress can be lost. The Buffalo school
system was first desegregated in 1872. Resegregation was so complete that the
234. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 5.
235. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794; 34
C.F.R. § 300.550, § 104.34. The BPSS is also bound by court orders in two cases concerning
the adequacy of education provided to trainable mentally retarded school children and to all
disabled school children, plus all those suspected of possessing a disability. Nyquist, 547 F.
Supp. at 474 n.6.
236. Nyquist V, 547 F. Supp. at 474-75 & n.6.
237. Id. at 474 (citing Andres v. Reville, Civ. 80-482 (W.D.N.Y. May 27, 1982)).
238. Reville Tr., supra note 7, at 39.
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struggle to desegregate had to be started over again, by a new generation of
black parents. More recently, with respect to the current integration process,
Judge Curtin expressed his concern that a change in the composition of the
Board could lead to less support for the integration process:
[T]here has been... a clear change in the community in attitudes,
but... it is like health. You might have terrific health today, and
tomorrow you are struck down with some very... serious illness.
And that is the way the school system is, because things change all
the time. It requires everlasting vigilance to be sure that . . .
whatever good things happen continue. If you begin to sit back and
say "oh, gee, we solved all our problems,".., believe me, then you
are in for a terrible, rude awakening.
239
As Reville stated, "this is the hard part." The litigation moved the BPSS
from the problem of moving bodies by bus from one neighborhood school to
another, to the "second generation" desegregation problem: internal tracking,
self-segregation within the schools, continued use of eurocentric materials,
high drop-out and suspension rate of black students, and re-segregation.
As a community moves from one set of problems to the next, we must ask
questions about the transfer of power in this process. For that is what the
integration issue is about, and that is what the resistance to change by the
white community is about. The black community wants the white community
to give up some of its power, and the white community does not want to do so.
We must ask, therefore, has any real power been transferred to the minority
community? Or has the desegregation only effectuated a superficial reorgani-
zation which does not change the underlying power structure?
One way to understand the transfer of power is to analogize power to a
bundle of sticks. When the group with power is asked to give up all of those
sticks (all of its power), it generally does not do that. More likely, it will give
up one of those "sticks," but not the others. One clear example can be seen in
the employment field. Because there are now laws which forbid employment
discrimination, blacks are being hired for jobs which were closed to them
before. Thus, one "stick" is being given up - the job, one index of power.
But the white community refuses to give up the other "sticks," that is, the
notion that the black person who is hired can perform the job as well, if not
239. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 19-20. On May 2, 1989, in city-wide elections for
all nine seats of the Buffalo School Board, five candidates backed by supporters of Mayor Griffin
won. Buffalo News, May 3, 1989, at Al, col. 5. According to Reville, this presented the fright-
ening prospect that the schools would be "taken over by a group hostile towards funding the
schools." Buffalo News, May 2, 1989, at A7, col. 2.
On May 30, 1989, Reville announced that he was leaving Buffalo to become head of the
school system in Little Rock, Arkansas, a city which is once again under court order to desegre-
gate. Buffalo News, May 30, 1989, at Al, col. 2. He was leaving, he said, because he thought
he had done what he wanted to do in the BPSS. Buffalo News, May 31, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
Also, he found the position in Little Rock appealing because "it's so historic, such a challenge."
Id.
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better than, a particular white person.2"
In the context of school desegregation in Buffalo, the white community
gave up one "stick," one index of its status and power - schools segregated
by race which showed the superiority of the white community. But it kept the
other "sticks;" that is, it refused to give up notions of difference and superior-
ity. It refused to accept a real change in identity or status. It refused to give
up the power to name the winners and losers in society.24' Black students
may attend schools with white students, but they will be kept separate through
ability tracking or placement in special education classes. Black students may
attend the same classes with white students, but their inferior position in soci-
ety will be maintained and strengthened by use of a eurocentric, racist curricu-
lum. Thus, while a certain action by the powerful might be seen as reflective
of social change, the system is merely reorganized to quell the imprecations of
the minority without modifying the underlying dynamic of racial superiority
and inferiority.242 Reville could not have been more correct in characterizing
the modification of this underlying dynamic as "the hard part."
V.
A COURT ADJUSTS TO ITS NEW ROLE
As noted earlier, the Buffalo school desegregation case is an example of
the new form of judicial decision-making required in structural reform litiga-
tion. This form of litigation, which began in the 1950s with the school deseg-
regation cases, requires judges to act in new ways. Instead of playing a
passive, short-term role, the judge becomes an active participant in reforming
the structure of a bureaucracy. The judge must not only decide if the agency
has acted in an unconstitutional manner, she must also decide how that insti-
tution should be re-shaped to eliminate the constitutional violation, and must
manage the reform process to ensure its elimination.24 3 This reform is, of ne-
cessity, a long-term process. As Judge Curtin described it, in this kind of case,
240. See, e.g., D. Bell, The Price and Pain of Racial Perspective, SOcIErY OF AMRIcAN
LAw TEACHERS, EQUALIZER 1 (Nov. 1986) (where white law professors, at the behest of dis-
satisfied white students, organized "enrichment lectures" to supplement the coverage of first-
year Constitutional Law class taught by a visiting black law professor who is a tenured full
professor at Harvard Law School and a nationally recognized scholar of constitutional law).
241. When "white flight" occurs, of course, the white community is refusing to give up
even one stick in its bundle of power.
242. For an interesting interpretation of this process, see D. MONTi, A SFMBLANCE OF
JUSTICE: ST. LOUIS SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND ORDER IN URBAN AMERICA 23-26 (1985)
(defining school desegregation in anthropological terms as "ritualized rebellion," wherein par-
ticipants resolve disputes in an indirect and stylized manner without having to address the
problems underlying the conflict). See also Reskin, Bringing the Men Back In: Sex Differentia-
tion and the Devaluation of Women's Work, 2 GENDER AND Soc'Y 58, 60 (1988) ("Dominant
groups remain privileged because they write the rules, and the rules they write 'enable them to
continue to write the rules.' As a result, they can change the rules to thwart challenges to their
position.") (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
243. See generally Fiss, supra note 98; Chayes, supra note 103.
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"[y]ou have a beginning,... a middle, and.., a never-ending."' 244 The organ-
ization of the parties in structural reform litigation, as well as the relationship
between the parties, is also different. New demands are placed on the judge.
Because of these new structures and demands, questions have been raised
about the proper role of the court and whether the court as now constituted is
well-suited to do what is being asked of it. Thus, questions are raised as to
both the integrity and the competence of the courts. These questions, both
theoretical and practical, will be addressed in this section.
This section will first address the practical issues raised, that is, questions
about the court's competence to handle structural reform. It will describe the
new structures and roles in institutional reform cases and point out potential
weaknesses in a framework which seeks to resolve major social policy issues
through court-ordered institutional reform. Next, it will look at these weak-
nesses in the context of the Buffalo desegregation case to see how one judge
addressed them.
This section will then address in two respects the theoretical issues con-
cerning the proper role of the judiciary in a democratic society. First, because
the court is required to become an active participant in a political process,
questions are raised as to the court's independence and its institutional integ-
rity. Again, this issue will be addressed in the context of the Buffalo case.
Second, this section concludes with a discussion of a concern raised by John
Ely in Democracy and Distrust.245 That concern was whether the twin demo-
cratic goals of egalitarianism and popular control can be harmonized in the
role of the judiciary in our society. We will look at the model of citizen partic-
ipation created by Judge Curtin in the remedial phase of the Buffalo desegre-
gation case to see if it provides an answer to that inquiry.
A. Institutional Competence
A major new development created by structural reform litigation is the
central role played by the judge in shaping and managing ongoing relief to
modify a major social institution. For example, in Buffalo, Judge Curtin not
only had to rule on whether or not the defendents had violated the constitu-
tional rights of black school children, he also had to see that the school system
was reformed in a way which would give meaning to the values of the Consti-
tution. Hence, the court, of necessity, has been involved in a long-term, close
relationship with the school system, a relationship which deepened over time.
Judge Curtin called this type of case a "management-style case," and noted
that the court had to get into the daily workings of the institution and know
what is going on with some degree of specificity, if it is to be able to assess and
reassess the direction of the remedial process.246 The judge is no longer
merely a "neutral umpire" in a dispute, but an active participant in the
244. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 1.
245. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST (1980).
246. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 14.
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litigation.247
It has been suggested that courts might not have the right tools and skills
to carry out this new assignment. One concern is that courts, as compared
with legislators and agency administrators, have limited tools for coercion.
They may not grant or withhold licenses and may not tax or grant economic
incentives or subsidies to coerce implementation of their orders.248 How then
will courts be able to ensure that their directives are followed? A second ques-
tion concerns the ability of the courts to obtain sufficient information to carry
out institutional reform. In these cases, judges need to know what is going on
within the institution they are reforming in some detail in order to modify
orders when needed and in order to address the unintended consequences of
those orders, as well as new problems. They therefore need detailed feedback
during the entire reform process. In an agency, one could send out investiga-
tors or hold a hearing. However, since the judicial process is not a self-start-
ing one, the judge must rely on the parties to call a problem to her attention.
How can she be sure that the parties will call important issues to her atten-
tion? The very factors which underly the integrity of the court - a judge's
isolation and independence from the political world, make it difficult for her to
get all the information necessary to make informed decisions. 24 9 Finally,
structural reform litigation places a heavy burden of long-term management
on a judicial system which was not created for that purpose."o What kinds of
implications does this have for the time available to other cases on the docket?
We find suggested answers to these questions by looking at how Judge
Curtin "managed" the institutional reform of the Buffalo school system, for in
structuring relief, he built in mechanisms to address some of these problems of
"fit" between his court as now constituted and the demands of this structural
reform litigation. First, Curtin recognized the problem of the court's inability
to get adequate information.
[When] you run a board of education, you have a lot of staff people
looking into details. We don't have any of that, so it's sort of a
clumsy way to do it. But really there was no other way to do it, so
we have to do our best with what we have.251
In addressing this issue, Curtin stepped neatly around the fact that litigation is
"self-starting" by not letting the parties get too far away from him. Indeed, by
meeting weekly with the parties during at least the first six years of the remedy
phase, he ensured that he would not need a "starting" mechanism, because the
247. Chayes, supra note 103, at 1286.
248. D. HoRowrri THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 34-35 (1977). One important co-
ercive tool the judge does have is her ability to rule on funding issues, and thereby force the city
to pay needed money for desegregation. As one commentator has noted, however, this will
likely create a "bureaucratic temptation to manipulate the courts into ordering changes that
will have the effect of expanding bureaucratic budgets." Id. at 257-58.
249. Id- at 35-36.
250. Chayes, supra note 103, at 1300.
251. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 57.
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case would never "stop." The parties were before him regularly, providing
him with constant feedback.252 He created a citizens' group which monitored
compliance for the first several years and reported back to him on problems in
the reform process. Finally, Curtin created an open-door policy with respect
to all of the community. It was such an effective policy that in 1988, twelve
years after the liability ruling, he was still receiving communications from par-
ents concerning problems with the schools. Curtin admitted that a lot of mis-
takes were made, but he tried to rectify them as soon as possible.2 3 By using
these various devices, he attempted to ascertain what was going on in the
schools. The information he gathered enabled the court to address problem
areas by modifying the thrust of the reform process.
Curtin also recognized that courts possess rather limited coercive tools.
In particular, Curtin noted the weaknesses in giving orders.254 To get around
this weakness, he arranged for the parties to sit and talk together until they
arrived at an agreement. Curtin also held frequent meetings with the parties
to iron out difficulties in the restructuring process. To coerce the public, (i.e.,
individuals not before the court) Curtin used the same strategy of holding
meetings within the community and getting the people to talk together. This
approach was intended to encourage people to arrive at a peaceful resolution
with respect to the court order to desegregate.
Finally, with respect to the burden that this strategy imposed on the
court, Curtin himself noted that managing this type of case was a "terribly
time-consuming sort of thing." Because he refused to appoint a master or staff
to handle the on-going management of the case, the entire burden fell on the
judge. Recently however, on the issue of funding, he delegated the mediation
and fact-finding to other entities: first, to a citizens' committee which was to
mediate the dispute, and then to Magistrate Maxwell, to hear the dispute and
to compile a record upon which he could base his decision.255 Judge Curtin
thereby created a structure wherein he could delegate some of the manage-
ment burden while still retaining control (both perceived and real) over the
process. Thus, Curtin addressed the issue of the capacity of the court to shape
and manage institutional reform with respect to adequate information, coer-
252. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Judge Curtin considered his role crucial to
the success of those early meetings where the details of the desegregation process were worked
out. In his view, some outsider, like the court, had to be there to say "this is the thing to do."
Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 16.
Curtin was also willing to ask the parties to act as the court's investigators. Hochflcld
related one instance of this which took place when, after the first few weeks of Phase I, there
was trouble brewing at Riverside High School. At that time, Judge Curtin asked her to go to
the school and see what was going on, and report back to him. Hochfield Interview, supra note
30, at 41.
253. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 24.
254. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 4.
255. The nature of the burden that was shifted from the court to the magistrate is shown
by the fact that Magistrate Maxwell heard testimony on this matter for 50 days, whereas oral
arguments before Judge Curtin on the issue of whether the magistrate's report should be
adopted lasted only one day. Nyquist VII, 618 F. Supp. at 808.
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cive tools and management burden.25 6 These issues are all relevant to the new,
central role of the judge in structural reform litigation and the problems raised
by that new role.
In addition to the problems created by the judge's new role, institutional
reform cases raise a second problem: discerning plaintiffs' real interests and
identifying those who represent those interests. The plaintiff is not an individ-
ual but a group or groups, or as here, several individuals and two groups.
Thus, the spokesperson may be a different person from the victim, and the
spokesperson and the victim may want different things. Similarly, there may
be several spokespersons for plaintiffs who want to proceed differently 57 In
fact, in this case there was such conflict between the plaintiff groups that at
one point counsel for the national NAACP refused to defend the district court
order requiring the city to provide more money for the desegregation effort,
much to the surprise of the Second Circuit. 8 Instead of a clear bi-polar
structure, the party has become "sprawling, and amorphous, subject to change
over the course of the litigation.
259
Related to this problem is the new relationship between defendants and
plaintiffs. In structural reform cases, the typical adversary relationship one
expects in a lawsuit is upset. Plaintiffs and defendants commonly want the
same reform outcome, and prefer that the remedial process consist of negotia-
tion and mediation. In this case, Curtin noted that the case would have been
much more difficult to handle had plaintiffs and defendant not accepted the
need for integration of the schools. He observed the spirit of cooperation be-
tween the parties, and stated that the nonconfrontational meetings over the
years had made a difficult task possible. In fact, during one funding dispute,
the parties were actually realigned so that plaintiffs, defendants the Board and
the Common Council were all aligned against the Mayor.2"
The'issue raised here, then, is one of representation. How can the court
be sure that the party bringing the claim is representative of the group it
claims to represent when there are several groups on one side, each taking a
256. Indeed, Judge Curtin suggested that in some ways a federal district court may handle
social reform issues better than an agency, as it does not have any kind of "agency ambition."
In addition, to the extent that the court is also concerned with due process and constitutional
issues, it is better able to "look at the bigger picture" than is an agency. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra
note 47, at 42-43. For a concurring view, see M. HOCHFIELD, THE NBw AIERICAN DI-
LEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DEsIGN 138-39 (1984) (arguing that courts
sometimes produce better policies as they may develop better plans, order disbursement orsuffi-
cient funding, and give school officials the power to make long-needed changes).
257. Fiss, supra note 98, at 18-23.
258. See supra note 83; cf Bell, Serving Two Masters" Integration Ideals and Client Inter-
ests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
259. Chayes, supra note 103, at 1284.
260. See Nyquist VII, 618 F. Supp. at 808 ("[T]his case, especially in its present posture, is
not a typical lawsuit. Both of the principal antagonists on these motions are defendants.").
Curtin also noted the difficulties of trying the case with the parties so realigned, stating that
"[t]he relationship between the Board and the City and their status as co-defendants make it
difficult to apply burden of proof rules in the ordinary fashion." Id. at 809.
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different position? How can the court be sure when plaintiffs and defendants
appear to be on the same side of the case? And what about all of the people
who will be affected by the outcome of the suit who are not even arguably
represented in court? Should not their interests be considered during the over-
haul of a major social institution even though they are not parties to the suit?
To address these concerns, Curtin opened the case up to greater represen-
tation in two different ways. First, he insisted that defendants go out into the
community and ask local community groups what they wanted to see in their
schools. He emphasized that he particularly wanted defendants to get feed-
back from the black community, thereby addressing a concern that the
NAACP perhaps did not represent the views of the entire black community in
Buffalo.2 61 Further, Curtin wanted to make sure that the entire community
was involved, including the colleges, the local bar and other professionals.
Judge Curtin opened up the case in a second way using the medium of
intervention. Early on in the remedial phase, he required the Board to notify
parents that they could object to proposed plans by filing an application to
intervene with the court.262 He also allowed intervention in the proceedings at
several stages: initially, by community groups that wanted to comment on the
first proposed desegregation plans; and later by organizations representing sev-
eral classes of children not directly represented by plaintiffs (latinos and dis-
abled), as well as by several unions, all of whom claimed an interest in the
court's remedial order concerning the hiring, promotion and assignment of
minority staff and teachers. Judge Curtin thus sought to address the problems
created by the new party structure and the new relations between the parties
through broader representation of community interests.
It is clear from the judge's actions in this case that the changes in society
which led to the new responsibility of the courts for structural reform of major
institutions have led the courts to make changes in their own structure and
operation in order to address new needs. As one commentator has noted, it is
not so terrible that the changes in society have led to changes within the judi-
cial system. What would be alarming is if those societal changes did not lead
to concommitant changes in the adjudicatory forms of the courts.263
B. Institutional Integrity
As noted earlier, courts managing institutional reform cases face the fact
of their limited coercive tools. How would Judge Curtin get compliance with
his orders to desegregate, especially from those citizens who were not parties
to the suit? We have seen that one of his strategies was to set up meetings in
the community in order to achieve compliance by having the public talk
through some of its concerns and anger. He also did not order defendants to
take steps that would lead to widespread defiance of his orders, thus obviating
261. Cf Bell, supra note 258.
262. See supra note 54.
263. Fiss, supra note 98, at 36.
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the need for coercion. While these strategies provided one solution to the
problem raised by the limited coercive tools at his disposal, they raise new
problems about the court's legitimacy.
In "Foreword: The Forms of Justice," Fiss suggested that questions of
legitimacy arise where the judicial process poses a threat to the court's inde-
pendence.2" He further suggested that by requiring the court to both declare
rights and actualize them, one thrusts the court into the world of politics and a
network of relationships which threaten its independence, and thus the integ-
rity of the judicial enterprise as a whole.26 Because the judge must devise
strategies to be effective, and must anticipate the response of the public to
those strategies, it is likely that he will tailor the right to fit whatever remedy is
obtainable, on the theory that getting half of what one is entitled to is better
than getting nothing.266
We can see that Judge Curtin was led to adopt this strategy as he
stretched out his requirements for system-wide desegregation over time to en-
sure that the whole process would not collapse. He was, in essence, bargaining
for long-term, successful desegregation with plaintiffs' constitutional rights to
immediate desegregated schooling. This dilemma, as Fiss pointed out, is not
one of the judge's making. Society requires the courts to play an active instru-
mental role in social reform while still expecting a neutral, independent judici-
ary. The way out of the dilemma, Fiss concluded, is to accept the fact that
there is no way out of it, and that the court will necessarily continue to strad-
dle the world of the Constitution and the world of politics.267
C. Popular Control and Egalitarianism
Judge Curtin's style of community participation in managing structural
reform and his fervent belief that courts should work within a democratic
framework to the extent possible in order to obtain the best result lead us to
another interesting question concerning the role of the court in a democratic
system. In Democracy and Distrust,268 John Ely addressed the question of
how courts can give weight to the majoritarian principles of democracy even
while they attempt to protect the rights of minorities from the majority. He
suggested that both goals of popular control and egalitarianism, while appar-
ently inconsistent, are concerned with participation in the democratic
processes, and could be harmonized through a "participation-oriented, repre-
sentation-reinforcing" approach to judicial review.269 One might wonder if
the representation framework Judge Curtin used to reform the public school
system is an example of Ely's "participation-oriented, representation-reinforc-
ing" function of the courts.
264. Id. at 44-52.
265. Id. at 53.
266. Id. at 54-55.
267. Id. at 57-58.
268. See supra note 245.
269. Id at 86-87.
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Superficially, it is easy to see the differences between Ely's theory and the
model suggested by Curtin's approach. Ely was talking about the court per-
forming its "representation-reinforcing" function when, for example, it sup-
ported voting rights for a minority. The court'was "clearing the channels of
political change" to ensure that there was real representation. By assuring
that various groups are indeed represented, the court helps them to participate
in society's democratic process through which they can then protect their in-
terests.270 Here, however, the substantive right at issue was equality in the
public schools rather than the right to participate in a democratic process of
representation. Instead, the minority interest was protected by the court, and
the representation component appeared when the court shaped the new struc-
ture. To that extent, Curtin's model and Ely's are different. But if Ely is not
talking about rights versus process, but rather about how to protect minorities
from the majority without contradicting fundamental principles of democracy,
then Judge Curtin's decision to develop the remedy in this case through con-
sultation with the community is an important variation of Ely's model.
There is an inherent danger in this model, however. The danger lies in
opening up the remedial phase for the majority to determine how to enforce
the constitutional rights of the minority after decades of single-minded assault
on those very constitutional rights by the majority. The danger is that the
remedy designed will not be adequate if the majority gets to control the shape
of that remedy.
The risk is minimized in this case, however. Although the judge en-
couraged input from the community in the remedy process, he did not open it
up in the sense of "one person, one vote." In Ely's model, when the court
extended the franchise, each person's vote counted in a real way. If enough of
those votes were amassed, the majority would be able to have its way. That is
not the way the "representation" functioned in the Buffalo school desegrega-
tion remedy phase. In the Buffalo case, citizens were given a chance to speak,
and perhaps their comments were taken seriously. But the result was pre-
ordained. The schools would be desegregated. The judge was probably cor-
rect in stating that even if the community did not get what it wanted, it was
still important that the community had its say. This is quite different from
saying that there would be popular control over the desegregation process. It
is likely that what the judge was doing in this case was "politicking," that is,
building constituencies to support his program for enhancing minority rights.
The irony here is that to the extent that the judge opened up the remedial
process in a truly democratic way (one person, one vote), his ability to protect
the interests of the minorities who came to court seeking protection might
have been diminished. But to the extent that he did not (and certainly he
cannot) allow a truly democratic process to control the remedy, he was able to
protect the constitutional rights of the minority. The tensions between popu-
270. Id. at 99.
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lar control and egalitarianism that Ely saw resolved in his "representation-
reinforcing" model are thus not fully resolved in Judge Curtin's model.
CONCLUSION
This Article has looked at school desegregation in Buffalo by focusing on
the acts of the judge, the key player in any structural reform litigation. It has
shown the important role Judge Curtin played in the planning stage of the
remedy, where he urged the community to see desegregation as a chance to
create a better school system, and insisted on community participation in the
planning process. By so doing, the judge let the community know it would get
something in exchange for what it was giving up. He provided an outlet for
the community to express its feelings about desegregation in a controlled set-
ting. Moreover, Judge Curtin brought other elites into the planning process,
thus providing more support for his orders. With respect to timing the pro-
cess of desegregation, we have seen that Judge Curtin allowed the Board to
proceed slowly in order to give it time to plan carefully and to allay the fears
of parents. The judge was aware that the partial remedies proposed by the
Board which he accepted were likely reversible on appeal, but he had the sense
that in Buffalo, actualizing the rights of black school children immediately
would probably have long-term negative effects on those same rights. This
approach was supported by the fact that it was not until five years after the
first order to desegregate that there were wide-spread mandatory assignments
for racial balance. Moreover, during that five-year period there had been par-
tial, largely voluntary desegregation that had proved to be successful. Hence,
when wide-spread forced busing finally took place in 1981, it fit within the
social norms of the community, and caused no violence. The new Buffalo
norms of desegregated schools expanded easily to accommodate mandatory
busing to actualize that norm.
Judge Curtin's personal, hands-on style of monitoring the process was
also important. His daily contacts with the parties, and his open-door policy
with non-parties made it possible for him to learn quickly of mistakes and to
rectify them. Changes within the school system were facilitated because Cur-
tin could arbitrate disputes between the parties immediately, thus avoiding the
more time-consuming formal court processes. He was willing to commit a lot
of time to this process, willing to use many ways of monitoring, willing to be
flexible about what the court should and should not do, and willing to push
against the limits of his authority to get the job done."'1 Judge Curtin had a
strong sense that he knew the Buffalo community and how to work with it to
achieve this goal. In sum, he had enough distance from the community as a
judge to be clear what had to be done to give meaning to the constitutional
271. Curtin Tr. 1987, supra note 47, at 21. See also Hochlield, supra note 256, at 136
(suggesting that courts which are rigid, shallow and naive manage the desegregation process
badly).
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values implicit in Brown and enough closeness to the community to be able to
actualize those values.
This Article also showed how important institutional actors supported
the judge's orders, and developed the themes wlich he set out. Eugene Reville
picked up on the theme of community involvement and developed it. He also
developed the notion that the community would be getting an excellent school
system in exchange for desegregating the schools. Reville's support was also
important as he explained what kinds of sanctions the court had available to
coerce compliance with its orders, that is, intervention by the executive branch
of government. The support of the religious community showed the city that
the desegregation process was not just a dialogue between the court and the
Board. It was a community-wide project. By working together as members of
different faiths and different races, the religious community showed the possi-
bility of building community out of diversity and the power of that type of
coalition. The combined support of all of these actors was crucial in obtaining
peaceful desegregation in Buffalo.
This Article also demonstrated that Buffalo can claim "success" for its
peaceful desegregation of the schools. Part of the reason Buffalo can make
this claim is the ease with which one can define "desegregation." There are
very few schools left in the system which are predominantly majority or mi-
nority schools. Black and white school children do in fact attend school to-
gether in Buffalo.
Beyond this fact, however, the notion of "success" is more problematic.
The very definition of "success" varies by one's mandate and one's constitu-
ency, and even within that framework, the definition varies over time as some
problems are solved, and others appear. Many things have changed at BPSS
since the first court order in 1976: standardized test scores are up throughout
the system, some schools are considered excellent, and there is a lot of excite-
ment generated by the magnet schools. This Article has also shown, however,
that many problems remain with respect to the treatment of black children in
the desegregated schools. As Reville stated, eliminating racism within the
BPSS is the next task, and the hardest task.
There is only so much that one judge can do. Judge Curtin and the BPSS
exist in the middle of a "complicated fabric"272 which includes many other
players - the Common Council, the Mayor, the federal government, the stu-
dents, the parents and the teachers' unions. Many other constraints exist,
such as the consent decrees with respect to students with disabilities and rul-
ings from superior courts. Not only do these other players and obligations
exist, but they change over time.
Part of this "complicated fabric" of change includes the new expectation
that courts shape and manage institutional reform, which results in courts
acting in new ways to adjust to the new expectations. This Article has shown
272. Curtin Tr. 1988, supra note 110, at 5.
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how Judge Curtin created new tools and structures to meet these new expecta-
tions. The major thrust of the changes were to open the court processes to the
public, to bring the community into the work of the court by soliciting com-
munity input on the shape of the remedy, by maintaining an open-door policy
for the public, by soliciting intervention from citizens affected by the orders,
by granting permissive intervention liberally and by forming citizen groups to
monitor and to negotiate the funding dispute. Curtin's model does not fit
Ely's vision of harmonizing the apparently inconsistent goals of popular con-
trol and egalitarianism; nonetheless Curtin's model, which attempts to democ-
ratize the remedy process in rights-based litigation, is an important variation
of Ely's model. This Article also showed that the new expectations facing
courts create tension between the court's independence and the requirement
that it operate in a political way in order to reform the institution in question.
The solution to that tension, as Fiss suggested, and as Curtin indicated, is to
simply do the task one is expected to do, while recognizing that there is no
way to resolve that tension.
Although this Article focuses on Judge Curtin's role in this case, it should
be remembered that his orders concerning the desegregation of the Buffalo
school system came in the middle of a long political process, one that began
some 140 years ago when black parents first petitioned for their children to
leave the black school and attend the better-provisioned white schools. This
case is only one step in that continuing process. What the litigation did was to
add one more player, the judge, a player with "considerable formal author-
ity,' 7 3 to this political process.
While answering some questions, this Article suggests many more for fur-
ther research. The first area for additional consideration is the political and
social environment of the white communities in Buffalo. How much cohesion
was there among the different groups? Did they split on the issue of racism?
What elements in this environment enabled peaceful desegregation to occur?
The second area is the nature of the different black communities in Buffalo.
How did they respond to the court orders to desegregate? Did they feel that
they were adequately represented by the NAACP and by CCHR? The final
area is the resegregation of the Buffalo schools after their initial desegregation
in the nineteenth century. What factors caused this resegregation? Do those
same factors exist today? Further research into these areas will deepen our
understanding of the process of school desegregation in Buffalo, as well as our
understanding of the dynamics of social change.
273. Kirp, Legalism and Politics in School Desegregation, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 924, 934-35.
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